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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WANDA EILEEN BARZEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20060627-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's "failure to marshal" argument is without merit as it fails to cite any 
facts not marshaled. 
The State has also failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
forcible medication is substantially likely to further the State's interest in this case. Many 
of the facts the State cites in support of its claim that competency restoration is 
substantially likely while adverse side effects are substantially unlikely, are irrelevant and 
misleading. The State's legal analysis similarly misconstrues the cases it relies upon, 
which cases are mostly irrelevant to Ms. Barzee. 
The State also fails to meet its burden under the additional Sell* factors. In its 
]Sellv. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed. 2d 297 (2003). 
analysis of the State's interest in prosecuting Ms. Barzee and contrary to the undisputed 
evidence on record, the State erroneously assumes that Ms. Barzee is a danger to herself 
or to others outside the confines of the state hospital. Also, the State presents insufficient 
evidence to make any conclusion about the likelihood of Ms. Barzee's long-term 
commitment to a mental health facility, as the trial court noted in its ruling. The State 
fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that its interest outweighs Ms. 
Barzee's liberty interest. 
Similarly, the State fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there 
are no less intrusive alternatives to forcible medication, or that it is medically appropriate 
in Ms. Barzee's case. 
Finally, the State's cursory assertion that Ms. Barzee's state constitutional law 
claim is inadequately briefed is insufficient to rebut Ms. Barzee's argument and analysis 
on that point, and should therefore be disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE STATE'S "FAILURE TO MARSHAL" ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT 
MERIT AND SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISREGARDED. 
The State generally asserts throughout its brief that Ms. Barzee has failed to 
marshal the evidence. This claim is without merit. The State's sweeping assertions of 
Ms. Barzee's purported failure to marshal are inaccurate, particularly when it fails to cite 
any unmarshaled facts. See, e.g., BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 29 ("A 
comparison of the parties' factual summaries quickly establishes defendant's marshaling 
2 
failures regarding Drs. Jeppson's and Whitehead's testimony" (citing pages in both 
parties' briefs, without more)); see also, id. at 35 (asserting, "The marshaled facts negate 
defendant's claim", without citing any facts not marshaled). The State fails to point to 
any specific facts not marshaled and further seems to suggest that Ms. Barzee can only 
meet a marshaling requirement, if any applies, if she skews the facts in the State's favor 
and thereby makes the State's argument for it. Id. at 37.2 
Moreover, given Ms. Barzee's lengthy and detailed Statement of Facts set forth 
in her opening brief and created with the marshaling requirement in mind, and as 
demonstrated by the State's unsupported assertions, the State is hard pressed to find even 
an obscure fact not marshaled. As a comparison between the record, the parties' briefs 
and their respective recitations of the facts demonstrates, the only thing Ms. Barzee's 
opening brief is lacking is the State's argument and its concomitant version of the facts. 
The State's "failure to marshal" argument is not only improper, but is so lacking 
in merit that it serves only to diminish the State's credibility. Accordingly, the State's 
2The State argues, "Again, defendant fails to properly marshal the facts. When 
marshaled, the evidence supports the court's assessments." Then in the following 
paragraph the State recounts some of the trial court's findings and the testimonies of Drs. 
Jeppson and Whitehead, all of which are in fact marshaled in Ms. Barzee's opening brief, 
in addition to other relevant facts not acknowledged by the State. See, e.g., BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT ("Br. Appt"), at 15-16, 27, 36-37. This pattern of one-sided and 
unsupported assertions is followed throughout the State's brief. However, unlike Ms. 
Barzee who has assumed the significant marshaling burden applies, the State tends to 
ignore those facts unfavorable to its position, thereby facilitating the State's ability to 
create a one-sided and thus inaccurate view of the evidence in this case. 
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claim that Ms. Barzee failed to marshal the evidence should be summarily disregarded. 
II. THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO ESTABLISH A SUBSTANTIAL 
LIKELIHOOD OF MS. BARZEE BEING RESTORED TO 
COMPETENCY THROUGH FORCED MEDICATION, OR A 
SUBSTANTIAL UNLIKELIHOOD OF ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS. 
The State's burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
involuntary medication is substantially likely to further the State's interest in this case is 
certainly formidable. The law and the evidence the State cites in its efforts to meet that 
burden is sometimes irrelevant and mischaracterized, and in some cases actually supports 
Ms. Barzee's position. While the evidence is lengthy and detailed, the legal and factual 
analysis is not complicated. 
A. THE STATE'S FACTUAL ANALYSIS IS MISLEADING. 
The trial court deferred to Dr. Jeppson in granting the State's motion to compel 
medication. R557-58. Therefore, the analysis hinges really upon one question: Did the 
State establish by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Jeppson's inexpert but 
"hopeful" "wait and see" (R579:14, 18-20, 30-1, 45) approach is substantially likely to 
render Ms. Barzee competent, and substantially unlikely to result in side effects impairing 
her ability to consult with her attorneys? See, United States v. Dallas, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 81162 (D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (rejecting a similarly vague treatment regimen as 
insufficient under Sell to establish a substantial likelihood of competency restoration). 
In other words, is "practicing [] an N of 1" and "see[ing] if she responds or not" 
(R579:45) clear and convincing evidence of & substantial likelihood that Dr. Jeppson's 
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approach will not just be beneficial, but will actually restore Ms. Barzee to competency? 
It is not, and the State cannot meet its burden on these facts. Accordingly, the State seeks 
to avoid this problem with its own evidence by focusing on facts that are irrelevant or 
misleading. 
For example, the State claims in its Statement of Facts that Dr. Jeppson 
experienced a 70-80 percent success rate in restoring "his psychotic delusional patients" 
to competency. Br. Appe. at 14.3 This mischaracterizes Dr. Jeppson's testimony. He 
opined that there was a 70-80 percent restoration rate among general populations of 
patients at the federal hospital in St. Louis and "some of the other districts have reported 
70 percent [W]e have those kinds of numbers at our hospital." R579:32. Dr. Jeppson 
also testified that this rate was equivalent to the rate of restoration in patients suffering 
from psychotic disorder NOS, his newly derived diagnosis of Ms. Barzee. Id. Dr. 
3In a footnote, the State argues, "Contrary to defendant's suggestion that [Dr. 
Jeppson's] death impacts the trial court's ruling, it was known prior to the medication 
hearing that the doctor was seriously ill, yet defendant never claimed the court should 
consider this fact in ruling" (citations omitted). This argument is both inappropriate, 
because it is not supported by the record, and untrue. The defense was never apprised by 
the State of Dr. Jeppson's illness and was shocked to learn of his death from the obituary 
section of a local newspaper, coincidentally on the same day the trial court issued its 
ruling in this case. The State's suggestion that the defense had an obligation to raise the 
possibility of Dr. Jeppson's death in the trial court is also either disingenuous or reflects a 
lack of understanding. Although the trial court improperly made Dr. Jeppson's death 
relevant when it deferred solely to him because of his supposed familiarity with Ms. 
Barzee rather than pointing to objective facts supporting a substantial likelihood of 
competency restoration (R558-59), neither Dr. Jeppson's purported familiarity nor his 
untimely death are relevant under Sell. Therefore, it would have been improper for the 
defense to ask the court to consider the impact of Dr. Jeppson's pending death. 
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Jeppson said nothing about "his" "psychotic delusional patients." Br. Appe. at 14. 
The State also suggests it is significant that Dr. Raphael Morris did not read all of 
Ms. Barzee's hospital records. Br. Appe. at 18, 38.4 If this is significant, then it should 
also be noted that neither Dr. Jeppson nor Dr. Whitehead testified that they had read all of 
Ms. Barzee's hospital records. R579. It is not even clear what Ms. Barzee's "full hospital 
file" (Br. Appe. at 18) is comprised of, much less that her treating physician reviewed it in 
its entirety. However, this is a non-issue and irrelevant to Dr. Morris' credibility and 
expertise. He was retained as an expert on the efficacy of antipsychotic medications on 
someone exhibiting Ms. Barzee's undisputed symptoms and history as reported by other 
experts. His incidental meeting with Ms. Barzee prior to the evidentiary hearing was 
merely fortuitous but not necessary. Nonetheless, as a result of that meeting, Dr. Morris 
has had as much contact with Ms. Barzee as Dr. Whitehead has. R579:59-60, 101. 
The State further quotes Dr. Xavier Amador's testimony that if there was only a 5 
percent chance of competency restoration, he would "do everything in [his] power to 
convince a patient to take medication . . . Untreated psychosis is a bad thing." Br. Appe. at 
24; R579:186. This testimony is irrelevant to the second prong of Sell. The fact that every 
doctor who testified, and presumably any doctor, would treat a patient if there was even a 
4The State also implies that Dr. Amador did not read Ms. Barzee's medical 
records. Br. Appe. at 38. There is no evidence to suggest Dr. Amador did not read Ms. 
Barzee's full file. Moreover, he testified that prior to one of his interviews with Ms. 
Barzee, he "had reviewed a substantial number of hospital records already." R579:182. 
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slim hope of some beneficial effect, has no bearing on the question of whether such 
treatment is substantially likely to result in competency restoration. It is certainly not clear 
and convincing evidence/ Moi eo v ei , beneficial effect, eithei ph.;; - sical 01 psychological, 
(Joes i lot equate to competency restoration, yet the State seems to suggest they are one and 
the same. 
The State's additional claim that "All the doctors. . . agree that unless defendant 
is medicated, she will remain incompetent1 ' (Br. Appe at 26), is also a mischaracterization, 
at least b> omissic n ' I he State's later assei tion that Di • \ mador ••''•*- : y 
medication could possibly accomplish" (Br. Appe. at 42) competency restoration is 
similarly a misstatement of the evidence, as can be observed by reviewing the record cited 
by the State (R579:166-6' 7, 1' 75 76, 18' 7, 191) (Addendum A). Neither Di !\ lorris noi Dr 
the State omits mentioning that neither doctor believes Ms. Barzee will be restored to 
competency via medication or any other means. R579:107-08, 115- 16, 117-18, 122, 123, 
128, I y . • 160-61, 162, 163-64, 166-69, 1 ; 1- 1 6, 1 7 ; , 191 ' 
51 he State makes a puzzling conclusion in its footnote 13 (Br. Appe. at 25). It 
compares Ms. Barzee's purported reluctant willingness to take medication solely to please 
hospital staff to Dr. Amador's proposed use of persuasive therapy to convince her it is in 
her best interest to do so. The State concludes, "Unlike Dr. Amador, Dr. Whitehead did 
not view this as consent." (Citations omitted). Notwithstanding the fact that these two 
situations are hardly similar, the State's conclusion is completely irrelevant. 
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Amador would treat her with medication. Br. Appe. at 39. However, notwithstanding the 
fact that Ms. Barzee did not ignore the substance of her own experts' testimony in this 
context (see, Br. Appt. at 22, 26), it is completely irrelevant to the question of whether 
there is a substantial likelihood that forcible medication will render Ms. Barzee competent. 
Similarly, the State's claim that Ms. Barzee ignored the "salient" fact that "no 
expert claimed that the anticipated side effects would significantly interfere with her 
ability to consult with her attorneys" (Br. Appe. at 39) evades the State's high burden to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that such interfering side effects are 
substantially unlikely. It also ignores Dr. Amador's singularly expert testimony that 
forcible medication would likely result in traumatic side effects of a nature that would 
presumably interfere with Ms. Barzee's ability to consult with counsel. R579:187, 190-
93. General assertions by the State's witnesses that serious side effects are rare and Ms. 
Barzee would be monitored for the same (R579:21,46-8, 5:5-6, 65-6, 199-200) are 
insufficient. Even the State acknowledges that the medications proposed in this case are a 
"new generation" (Br. Appe. at 40), and as is the nature of all newer drugs, side effects are 
emerging and thus not all known at this early stage. 
The State further notes, "[Defendant argues why the trial court could have 
accorded more weight to the defense opinions, but does not establish why the court's 
failure to do so is clear error." Br. Appe. at 29 (emphasis in original). Ms. Barzee has 
never taken the position that the trial could have ruled in her favor; rather, her position is 
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that the trial court should have done so because the clear weight of the evidence is 
overwhelmingly in her favor. Bi Appt. 29-50. I lie trial court ignored the scientific 
entire case who admitted he was not an expert; and as the primary physician charged with 
the responsibility of restoring Ms. Barzee to competency; he had what he apparently 
construed as a professional stake in persuading the trial court to compel medication. 
prove by clear and convincing evidence a substantial likelihood of restoration.6 
The State fails to disclose other facts unfavorable to its position. Noting that 
delusional disorder is rare, the State claims that only Dr. Amador reached that diagnosis. 
Barzee's case, and more importantly, the fact that all experts have agreed that her 
delusional symptoms are most prominent and have remained constant.7 See, e.g., R336-
6The State attempts to bolster its evidence and the tiiai cuiui & lining oy assei u:\^, 
without any citation to the record, that "the trial court observed and interacted with 
defendant during numerous court proceedings over two years." Br. Appe. at 34. Not only 
is this statement not supported by the record and therefore inappropriate, but there is no 
aspect of the ruling that even suggests the court employed any such considerations. 
7The State notes Dr. Amador had not seen Ms. Barzee for about a year prior to the 
hearing (Br. Appe. at 38), but fails to explain why this is significant, particularly when 
none of her symptoms had changed and the hospital treatment team had also not seen her 
for about the same amount of time. R579:18. Also, Dr. Jeppson left on medical leave for 
two and a half months shortly after the State filed its motion during the Fall of 2005, and 
there is no evidence to suggest that the duration or quality of his contact with Ms. Barzee 
exceeded or even met that of Dr. Amador R ^7Q* 1 ° 
9 
37; R577:19-20, 25, 33, 37-8, 47, 52, 55, 72-3; R578:10-l 1, 14-16, 18,23; R579:12,14-
15, 18-19,41-2, 77-8, 103, 118,130,154, 165, 167-69, 171-73, 191, 193-94. 
Drs. Cohn and Kovnick initially reached separate diagnoses of schizophrenia and 
shared psychotic delusional disorder, respectively, while noting that Ms. Barzee suffers 
from delusions. R336-37. Dr. Berge agreed with Dr. Kovnick in reaching his diagnosis of 
shared psychotic delusional disorder but stated he would change the diagnosis to 
delusional disorder if Ms. Barzee's delusions continued after her separation from the co-
defendant, which they have. R577:19-20, 52. In the meantime, Dr. Jeppson, Ms. Barzee's 
"default" treating physician, also diagnosed her with delusional disorder. R579:12. 
Although Ms. Barzee's delusions continued, coinciding with the hospital's and 
the State's efforts to force medicate Ms. Barzee and in anticipation of a Sell hearing, Dr. 
Jeppson for the first time changed to the "working" and less specific diagnosis of 
psychotic disorder NOS. R579:12, 33, 38-41. Dr. Nielson concurrently reached the same 
diagnosis. R578:10-12, 19-20. The State has little to no response to the fact that both Dr. 
Morris and Dr. Amador, who are irrefutably the most highly qualified experts on the 
subject, pointed out that a diagnosis of psychotic disorder NOS is based on a lack of 
information, and is therefore questionable after the hospital has had two years to observe 
Ms. Barzee and thereby reach a narrower diagnosis. R579:128-29, 132-33, 154-55. And 
contrary to the State's representation of the facts (Br. Appe. at 35), although he had 
formed an informal opinion, Dr. Morris did not make a formal diagnosis of Ms. Barzee 
10 
and was not retained to do so. R 579:130. 
Finally, Dr. Amador, presumably the final word on the subject since he actually 
upon in reaching their diagnoses, concluded that Ms. Barzee suffers from delusional 
disorder. R579:152, 154, 164. Notably, the State fails to acknowledge that Dr. Amador 
reached this diagnosis from the beginning of his contact with Ms. Barzee two years prior 
On a related note, the State claims, "While the state doctors opined that labels 
were less important than symptoms, Drs. Amador and Morris admitted that even if her 
symptoms did not change, what label attached would change their restoration projections 
(R57 9:1 28, 166 6 ; , 1: ; 5 76, 186)." Bi - i|: >] >e.at36 Ihis i: ;notti ue. \ i e\ iew < i f 1 he 
State's citations tc • the record is ilh lminating and are inch ide d in Addendum A,. 
On page 128 of the transcript, consistent with the testimony of some of the 
State's experts, Dr. Morris discusses how diagnosis impacts the likelihood of restoration. 
Nowhere does he claim that prognosis is not impacted by symptoms. I o the contrary, i •> n. 
Ms. Barzee's symptoms in forming their diagnoses and conclusions. R579:102-04, 107-
08, 115-18, 122-23, 128, 132-33, 137, 145, 154-55, 162-64, 165-67, 171 77, 19394 
Further on pages 166-6 7, Dr. Amador explains ; - unlikelihood of competency 
11 
psychosis, and "the primary competency impairing symptom of grandiose delusions" 
(R579:166). On pages 175-76, Dr. Amador discusses the negative impact of Ms. Barzee's 
lack of insight (i.e., anosygnosia, a symptom of delusional disorder) on her prognosis for 
restoration to competency. He also explains if Ms. Barzee suffered from schizophrenia or 
psychotic disorder NOS, although anosygnosia would still negatively impact prognosis, 
Ms. Barzee's chances for restoration would be slightly higher. Finally, on page 186, Dr. 
Amador explains that he would do everything in his power to treat a psychotically ill 
patient even if there was only a 5 percent chance of beneficial effect. A specific diagnosis 
is not even mentioned. 
Based on the foregoing, the State's characterization of this cited testimony as an 
admission that Drs. Morris and Amador would not change their prognosis for restoration 
even if Ms. Barzee's symptoms were to change, is misleading. Their respective 
testimonies are all about how Ms. Barzee's symptoms negatively impact her prognosis. 
The State also cites pages 311, 328 and 343 of the DSMV-IV8 as supporting 
authority for the State's claim that "a [psychotic disorder NOS] diagnosis remains valid as 
long as symptoms of two or more psychoses exists." Br. Appe. at 36 and its Addendum E? 
The citations given do not support the State's conclusion. Page 311 is missing from Ms. 
Barzee's copies of the State's brief. Page 328 states: 
^Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. 
9The State's reliance on the DSMV-IV seems ironic given that Dr. Jeppson, the 
doctor deferred to by the trial court, does not rely upon it much. R579:31, 35, 54. 
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A diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified may be made if 
insufficient information is available to choose between Delusional Disorder and 
other Psychotic Disorders or to determine whether the presenting symptoms are 
substance induced or the result of a general medical condition. 
(Bold in 01 iginal; emphasis added) Page 343 states inpei tii le nt j: ai t: 
This category [of psychotic disorder NOS] includes psychotic symptomatology 
(i.e., delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized i 
catatonic behavior) about which there is inadequate information to nu;l-. ./ 
specific diagnosis or about which there is contradictory information, or disorders 
with psychotic symptoms that do not meet the criteria for any specific Psychotic 
'• • Disorder, • 
(Emphasis added) (Bi \ ppe. Addendum. E). 
There is nothing in this language to suggest that a diagnosis of psychotic disorder 
NOS "remains valid as long as symptoms of two or more psychoses exists." Bi \ppc tt 
36 R ather, it is consistent \v ith both Di I lords' and Dr. Amador's testimony that it is 
geiiei all) a temporary diagnosis based i lpon a lack of infoi i ,y-29, 
132-33, 154-56), and is therefore not appropriate after two years of observation and after 
Ms. Barzee has already been diagnosed several times with more narrow diagnoses. 
Moreover, Dr. Jeppson's stated reason foi changing the diagnosis from the 
he admitted Ms. Barzee had exhibited when he first diagnosed her with delusional disorder 
(R579:12, 22, 41), and which he characterized as atypical of that diagnosis.10 R579:33. 
10Dr. Whitehead did not diagnose Ms. Barzee. However, while he found the 
"broad umbrella" diagnosis of psychotic disorder NOS reasonable given the "limitations 
of assessment", he agreed that a diagnosis of delusional disorder is also reasonable. 
13 
However, the DSMV-IV specifically notes that this type of thinking is in fact symptomatic 
of delusional disorder: 
Ideas of reference (e.g., that random events are of special significance) are 
common in individuals with this [delusional] disorder. Their interpretation of 
these events is usually consistent with the content of their delusional beliefs. 
Br. Appe. Addendum E at 325-26. 
Even to a layman, Ms. Barzee's belief that God gives her messages through 
movies is consistent with the content of her grandiose religious delusions that she is the 
mother of Zion and a prophet. That Dr. Jeppson was unaware that this behavior is 
symptomatic of delusional disorder may be attributed to his status as a "clinician" rather 
than as an expert, he did not "pack around" the diagnostic manual relied upon by 
professionals in his field, nor had he read it recently. R579:31, 35, 54. 
The State's desired interpretation of the facts in this case does not change them. 
Nor do the irrelevant facts cited help the State in meeting its significant burden in 
establishing a substantial likelihood of restoration via involuntary medication. Also, the 
State hardly mentions the likelihood or the possible impact of side effects, other than to 
mention that Drs. Jeppson, Whitehead, and Morris testified such effects are mostly mild 
and those considered more serious are controllable. Br. Appe. at 34. 
While this characterization of the evidence misconstrues Dr. Morris' testimony 
R579:61-2, 76-8. However, Dr. Whitehead is the only expert who believes Ms. Barzee's 
diagnosis is irrelevant to her prognosis. R579:62, 80. 
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that the risks associated with medication outweigh the benefits in this case (R579:123-26), 
it also ignores two important facts that defeat the State's ability to meet its burden: (1) Drs. 
Jeppson and Wl litel lead lacked the i eqi lisite expertise to accoi iiit foi Ms. Barzee's • 
characteristics, symptoms, and history in reaching their general conclusions; and (2) Di 
Amador, who indisputably has the requisite knowledge and expertise to testify regarding 
the traumatic side effects observed in patients similar to Ms. Barzee, testified that such 
, • . ii ; "his testimony was not refuted. 
The v ;• ' • . ^tablish i cleai and con1' < incing e v idence a substantial 
likelihood that involuntary medication will restore Ms. Barzee to competency, or a 
substantial unlikelihood of side effects interfering with her ability to consult with counsel. 
. B. THE STATU "S LEGAL ANALYSIS IS ALSO
 1 N C 0 R R E C T 
I n ;ul<ii1ion t o (lithi luiKl.'tmnilal pioblrnis w ilh llir Stale's version ol I lie facts, 
supra, the State's legal analysis is similarly flawed. The State cites several cases in 
support of its claim that forcible medication is substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee 
competent V ieview of that analysis demonstrates that the State's reliance upon these 
.YtMN ,. both misplaced and m isleading - • •'..' • • ' • ' • /• 
The State cites United States v. Weston11 in support of its claim that forcible 
medication is substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee competent and substantially 
]1255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 106" (2001) (Addendum 
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unlikely to result in adverse side effects. Br. Appe. at 31, 38, 40. However, Weston is 
largely irrelevant because it predates Sell and does not address whether medication was 
likely to restore competency in that case. Further, Weston was schizophrenic and a danger 
to himself and others such that the court found that his "liberty interest" "gives way when 
medication is essential to mitigate the detainee's dangerousness." Id. at 874-75, 876-78. 
See also, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (allowing involuntary medication if 
a detainee is a danger to himself and treatment is in his best medical interest). Therefore, 
the court in Weston only considered the question of involuntary medication in the Harper 
context of whether it was medically appropriate and "necessary to accomplish an essential 
state policy" {Id. at 887). The question of the likelihood of restoration was not at issue. 
Therefore, Weston has no relevance to the question of whether forcible medication is 
substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee competent. 
The State also places great weight on the vaguely referenced (R579:32) USMC 
statistics of a 70-80 percent restoration rate among general populations of psychotic 
patients. The State cites a number of mostly obscure cases as support for its claim that 
"other courts have accepted the validity of [general statistics from the U.S. Medical 
Centers in Springfield and Butner] in ordering involuntary medication of psychotic 
patients." Br. Appe. at 38. This claim is not true. 
In United States v. Morris, 2005 WL 348306, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38791 (D. 
Del. Feb. 8, 2005) (Br. Appe. Addendum G), the court did not rely upon the USMC 
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statistics in reaching its determination that involuntary medication was substantially likely 
to render Morris competent. Indeed, there is no analysis on that point whatsoever, as the 
decision is substantively an order compelling medication and the court merely concludes 
that the government met its burden. Id. 
The State similarly misconstrues the additional cases it cites. Br. Appe. 38-9. 
See, United States v. Archuleta, 2006 WL 2476070, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63526 (D. 
Utah Aug. 24, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum G) (same); United States v. Ballestros, 2006 
WL 224437, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6011 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum 
G) (no mention of USMC studies and court merely concludes based on expert's testimony 
outlining treatment regimen that restoration of competency is substantially likely); United 
States v. Martin, 2005 WL 1895110, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 
2005) (Br. Appe. Addendum G) (the court relies solely on the forensic report, not any 
statistics, and the decision is devoid of any legal analysis on the likelihood of competency 
restoration and the unlikelihood of side effects); United States v. Kimball, 2004 WL 
3105948, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26586 (N.D. Iowa March 23,2004 (same12; Br. Appe. 
Addendum G). The most that can be said about these cases is that the defendants were 
12The extent of the court's analysis is as follows: "Dr. Evans . . . opined that 
psychotropic medication is the treatment of choice for the defendant to restore her to 
competency. [He] further opined that there is a substantial probability that such treatment 
will result in the restoration of defendant's competence. Dr. Pederson likewise opined 
that the only course of treatment likely to effectively treat the defendant's condition is 
antipsychotic medication. The court thus finds that the administration of medication is 
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial." 
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treated at USMCs, which is no surprise since these are all federal cases.13 
The State's reliance on United States v. Evans, All F. Supp. 2d 696 (U.S. Dist. 
Ct. W. Va. 2006) (Addendum C) is similarly misplaced. Evans was diagnosed with 
paranoid schizophrenia and the empirical studies relied upon in predicting his restorability 
via medication "indicated] a substantial success rate . . .for patients like Evans" Id. 
(emphasis added).14 Similarly, in United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. La. 
2005) (Addendum D), the government's experts opined "a 70-80% success rate of 
restoring" all patients, many of them schizophrenic as was Algere, and further cited a 
separate empirical study demonstrating an 87 percent restoration rate in a group of 
patients, "most of whom were schizophrenic" as well as studies cited in a practice 
guideline published by the American Psychiatric Association relevant to Algere's 
symptoms and diagnosis. Id. at 742. 
13The State implies that medication will be successful in Ms. Barzee's case when it 
cites United States v. Ghane, 2006 WL 3160691, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79421 (W.D. 
Mo. July 12, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum G), noting that Ghane became competent when 
he took medication, "but when his medication was stopped, again lost his competency." 
Br. Appe. at 33, n. 15. However, a review of the order in Ghane evidences that 
medication was not effective and caused negative side effects. Although Ghane took 
medication voluntarily, "his perception of events around him is still filtered through his 
delusions and negatively impacts his ability . . . to participate meaningfully in his own 
defense." Id. 
14The State claims Ms. Barzee "does not acknowledge that after Evans' case was 
remanded, additional evidence, similar to the evidence presented in this case, was 
presented and involuntary medication order." Br. Appe. 39. This is inaccurate. The 
Evans court found persuasive various studies finding an 80 percent restoration in cases 
similar to Evans' and Evans' prior history of responding positively to medication. Id. at 
703-04. 
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Finally, in United States v. Bradley, All F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) (Addendum 
E), which is also cited by the State, again there is no mention of the USMC studies and the 
testifying expert merely outlined his proposed treatment regimen. Id. atl 115. Moreover, 
the Bradley court noted that the "record admits of little challenge to the proposition that 
administration of antipsychotic drugs would substantially aid Bradley's return to 
competency. We conclude the Government met its burden . . . " Id}5 
The State's claim that all of the foregoing cases "accepted the validity" of the 
general restoration rates reported by the USMC in determining a substantial likelihood of 
restoration is inaccurate. Most cases merely provide bare conclusions and/or orders with 
no factual analysis, and those that do provide any analysis are irrelevant to Ms. Barzee's 
case. They have no similarity to her history or symptomology. Therefore, the State's 
reliance on these cases to support its claim that Ms. Barzee is substantially likely to be 
rendered competent via forcible administration of medication is disingenuous. 
In asserting that the prognosis for competency restoration can be extrapolated 
from general restoration rates and applied to a specific patient, the State ignores the 
testimony of one of its own experts, Dr. Paul Whitehead. In discussing the fact that 15 out 
of 15 patients suffering from psychotic disorder NOS were restored to competency at the 
Utah State Hospital, Dr. Whitehead cautioned: 
15The Bradley court also conducted a detailed analysis of the potential side effects, 
which analysis would not be possible here, based on obviously more extensive evidence 
presented in Bradley that was absent in this case. Id. at 743-44. 
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All 15 were restored, but I wouldn't extrapolate that to mean that there is a 100-
percent chance someone with that diagnosis would be restored. I don't do 
statistics on these types of numbers because it is not research, and research is 
difficult to do with people who are . . . in a hospital against their will". 
R579:63. 
The law cited by the State does not support the trial court's findings and 
conclusions or a substantial likelihood of restoration in Ms. Barzee's case. 
III. THE STATE FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN UNDER THE REMAINING 
SELL FACTORS. 
A. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE AN IMPORTANT 
INTEREST OVERRIDING MS. BARZEE'S LIBERTY.16 
Ms. Barzee has already conceded that the serious nature of the crimes alleged in 
this case weigh in the State's favor. Br. Appt. at 42. Delay and concomitant fair trial 
concerns are an issue in every case. However, any remaining considerations under this 
factor are in Ms. Barzee's favor and outweigh the State's interest. In any event, the State 
has not otherwise established the contrary by clear and convincing evidence. 
First, the State is mistaken in claiming that "the parties disagree on defendant's 
inherent dangerousness to herself or others outside the limited confines of the state 
16In claiming the State must demonstrate an interest overriding Ms. Barzee's 
liberty, the State accuses Ms. Barzee of mischaracterizing the proper standard, "which 
requires clear and convincing evidence that important state interests are at stake in 
restoring defendant's competency." Br. Appe. at 30 (citation and punctuation omitted). 
This is a distinction without a difference. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d at 
879 (explaining the required showing that "other govemraent interests override a pretrial 
detainee's liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication." 
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hospital." Br. Appe. at 31. Not only is this assertion unsupported by any citation to the 
record, but the record establishes that all experts, including the State's experts, agree that 
Ms. Barzee is not a danger to herself or to others in any setting. R579:16-17, 19-21, 27, 
52, 60. Second, the State's evidence leaves the question of Ms. Barzee's continued 
commitment to a mental health facility unanswered. 
It is not Ms. Barzee's position only that the trial court "should have considered 
other 'special circumstances' unique" (Br. Appe. at 32) to Ms. Barzee's case. In addition, 
it is Ms. Barzee's position that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that its interest in bringing Ms. Barzee to trial outweighs her liberty interest to 
refuse antipsychotic medications. Given the State's failure to meet this burden and its 
reliance upon the incorrect assumption that any expert in this case has found Ms. Barzee to 
be a danger to anyone, the State has failed to meet its burden under this prong. 
B. THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT FORCIBLE MEDICATION 
IS NECESSARY. 
The crux of the State's argument on this point is that "no evidence exists that 
alternate, less intrusive means than involuntary medication are likely to restore [Ms. 
Barzee's] competency." Br. Appe. at 41. Then again and without citing the record, the 
State erroneously claims that "[e]very doctor who examined defendant opined that only 
medication can restore her competency." Id. and at 42. This claim misconstrues the 
evidence in this case. See, argument and citations to the record, supra. Accordingly, the 
premise underlying the State's argument is flawed. 
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Contrary to the State's argument, what Dr. Amador's testimony about the 
alternative treatment of motivational enhancement therapy did establish is that there is at 
least one less intrusive alternative to forcibly medicating Ms. Barzee. The State did not 
rebut this evidence. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Barzee is resistant to formalized therapy 
and treatment for a mental illness she does not believe she has does not lead to the State's 
conclusion that she would be unwilling to talk to a treating professional in a different 
setting. To the contrary, according to Dr. Amador, that is precisely the value of this 
alternative therapy because it is designed to treat individuals like Ms. Barzee who exhibit 
anosygnosia. R579:186-87, 190-91. The double value inherent in this treatment modality 
is that it has both a therapeutic effect and may persuade a patient to voluntarily take 
medication that may also have some beneficial aspect. If successful, of course this 
treatment modality would make the issues under Sell moot. Id. 
Therefore, from the record evidence, it is known that at least one less intrusive 
alternative to forcible medication exists. The State failed to elicit any evidence that this 
alternative is not a viable treatment for Ms. Barzee. It has never been tried in this case. 
Therefore, its viability has to be presumed at this juncture aind it cannot be concluded that 
the State met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that no less 
intrusive alternatives to forcible medication exist. 
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C. THE FOURTH SELL FACTOR OF MEDICAL APPROPRIATE-
NESS IS SUPERFLUOUS UNLESS CONSIDERED IN THE 
CONTEXT OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION. 
Ms. Barzee did concede in her Petition that every expert testified that 
administration of antipsychotic drugs is medically appropriate in her case. However, this 
is not a preservation problem and, as noted in her opening brief and cited by the State, 
medical appropriateness will be true with every patient unless there are rare and 
unforeseen health problems that might be exacerbated by a proposed medication. 
Presumably in such cases, alternative medications will be found that are medically 
appropriate. Hence, this factor is meaningless as it will likely always be met. 
Nonetheless, the fact that in certain cases such as Ms. Barzee''s, forcible 
medication is substantially likely to result in adverse traumatic side effects cannot be 
ignored when considering whether such treatment is medically appropriate. It is well 
known that depression, suicidal ideation, paranoia, and post-traumatic-stress disorder have 
physical as well as emotional ramifications. To argue that it is medically appropriate to 
force an emotionally fragile patient into a severe depression through involuntary 
medication merely because she suffers from an illness that a doctor would normally treat 
with medication is a non sequitur. 
For this prong of the Sell analysis to be relevant and have meaning, the medical 
appropriateness of involuntary medication must be considered. 
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IV. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DO MORE THAN ASSERT THAT MS. 
BARZEE'S STATE LAW CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
In just over one page, the State generally asserts that Ms. Barzee's state 
constitutional law claim is inadequately briefed and unfairly before this Court, without 
more.17 Br. Appe. at 45-6. This conclusory argument is insufficient to rebut Ms. Barzee's 
6 pages of argument and legal analysis, including the lengthy legal history of the 
compassionate treatment of the mentally ill in this state, and the exceptional circumstances 
meriting this Court's consideration of the issue on this appeal. 
Accordingly, the State has failed to rebut Ms. Barzee's position and this Court 
should consider the issues in this case within the context of the due process protections 
afforded in this state. 
17The State makes much of the fact that Ms. Barzee did not cite Utah Code Ann. 
§77-15-6.5, the state codification of the Sell factors. This argument is disingenuous. At 
the medication hearing, the State indicated on the record: 
At the outset, the only other thing that counsel have raised together . . . is the 
standard of proof for the Court to make its decision. Sell was silent We each 
agree it should be clear and convincing. The Tenth Circuit believes it is clear and 
convincing, so that's the case law that's applicable to this federal circuit, and 
legislation was introduced last week at the legislature to help these matters in the 
future, and that legislation provides for a clear and convincing standard. 
R579:6 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute was pending and only enacted after the 
medication hearing and after the parties had briefed the issue. The parties could not brief 
the issues within the context of pending legislation. Also, the trial court framed its 
findings, conclusions, and ruling in the context of Sell, only mentioning the recently 
enacted statute incidentally. R530-68. In any event, Ms. Barzee's legal analysis does not 
change under the subsequently enacted statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Barzee respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling 
granting the State's motion to compel medication. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of December, 2006. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
R:579:128,166-67,175-76,186-87,191 
(Excerpts from Transcript from Hearing on Motion to Compel Medication) 
1 unlikely she is going to become competent, so thatfs not more 
2 than likely or even substantially likely, but can you give us a 
3 sense for what the percentage rate is that you think she would 
4 be around, Ms. Bar zee, the percentage rate you think you would 
5 attribute to her in becoming competent again? 
6 A I have given this some thought. It is not easy to 
7 give an exact number. It would really also depend on the exact 
8 diagnosis. So I would say, from my experience and also looking 
9 at her prognostic factors, if she had -- and depending on the 
10 diagnosis, it would range somewhere between 20 and 35 percent. 
11 If she had a delusional disorder, which has been discussed 
12 here, I would give her a lower percentage. If she had 
13 schizophrenia, I would give her a better chance of responding. 
14 Q Psychotic disorder is somewhere in the middle there? 
15 A I think we just have to figure out what the diagnosis 
16 is. 
17 Q Everybody is talking about psychotic disorder NOS, 
18 right? 
19 A Right. 
20 Q You run the gamut from delusional disorder to 
21 schizophrenia? 
22 A Psychotic NOS is simply either schizophrenia, 
23 substance abuse psychotic disorder, or psychotic disorder 
24 secondary to a medical condition. It is one of those. I 
25 didn't do a physical exam, but in my assessment I didn't pick j 
1 treating delusional disorder, but that was primarily with 
2 patients with somatic delusions, not the grandiose type. 
3 Q Grandiose delusions are a symptom that could be 
4 associated with delusional disorder or other psychotic 
5 disorders, right? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q But those grandiose delusions themselves, of which 
8 everybody agrees Ms. Barzee has and is incompetent because of, 
9 are how difficult to treat? Much more difficult to treat? 
10 A I wouldn't say much more difficult. If you look at 
11 the different subtypes of delusions, delusions of jealousy, 
12 somatic delusions, paranoid delusions, grandiose delusions, 
13 etc., if you look at that list, I put that as the hardest to 
14 treat. 
15 Q She has the hardest delusion to treat? 
16 A Yes. Except I am not talking about a big change in 
17 the prognosis; but within those subtypes of delusions, yes. 
18 Q Can you speak a little about her prognosis and the 
19 different factors, indicators? What's her prognosis, in your 
20 opinion? 
21 A I think, given the very long duration of untreated 
22 psychosis, given the diagnosis of delusional disorder, given 
23 the primary competency impairing symptom of grandiose 
24 delusions, there is a very low likelihood. Again, you know, as 
25 in the United States vs. Ghane, however you pronounce it, the 
1 findings of fact there were delusion disorders about a 
2 10-percent chance. I wouldn't go that far. I am a little bit 
3 more optimistic. I would say there is maybe a 20-percent 
4 chance that she will respond to antipsychotic medications to 
5 the point where it will restore her to competency. 
6 Q So you are not saying that if she was given 
7 antipsychotic medications that she wouldn't respond in 
8 different ways? 
9 A From my clinical assessment, in getting to know 
10 Ms. Bar zee as well as I have, both through interview and 
11 collateral sources of information, I have to agree with 
12 Dr. Jeppson, I think the most likely first — if I had to make 
13 a prediction — the thing that's going to happen is she is 
14 going to feel less pressure to talk about these things, and 
15 that there is a high likelihood that the fundamental delusional 
16 beliefs aren't going to change. 
17 Q So that's a distinction that we have been talking 
18 about here. So she will feel less pressured to talk about 
19 them. So why doesn't that help her back to competency? Or why 
20 doesn't that render her likely to be competent? 
21 A Just because I can have a conversation with you about 
22 my case doesn't mean that I have stopped believing that God is 
23 in charge of this whole thing. It doesn't mean that I have 
24 stopped believing. If you still have those beliefs, rather, 
25 given your hypothetical, it is still going to influence your 
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about other topics. If he was talking about flexibility with 
respect to her delusional thought process itself, the behaviors 
surrounding it, thinking behaviors surrounding it, that's a 
different fellow fish. I didn!t hear him talk about that. 
Regardless, we have a very different prognosis on the 
likelihood that medications are going to impact her delusion. 
Q (By Mr. Finlayson) I guess you have explained quite a 
bit as to why you have that prognosis. What is your prognosis? 
Tell us, on the standard for substantially likely to render her 
competent, could you give us your opinion? 
A Taking together my clinical experience and doing 
studies on many, many patients with poor insight, with a 
subgroup of very long durations of untreated psychosis, because 
of the nature, I have kind of an unusual clinical experience, 
compared to a lot of other people, in that I have worked in a 
16 dedicated National Institute of Mental Health funded 
schizophrenia research unit. My particular interest is lack of 
insight, so the patients we are looking for are a lot like 
Ms. Bar zee, who do not understand, will take many years to ever 
understand there is an illness. Leaning on all that direct 
experience and the research, I think you have a very low 
probability. My estimate is, if I had to make an estimate, as 
you sometimes have to, 20-percent likelihood that any 
antipsychotic medication is going to substantially reduce the 
severity for delusions to restore her to competency. 
1 Q Would that change if it was psychotic disorder NOS or 
2 schizophrenia? 
3 A No. I think it would move me up a little bit, maybe 
4 give her about a 30-percent chance. If it were schizophrenia 
5 or psychotic disorder NOS, that would move me up. If it was 
6 psychotic manic depression, that would move me up to about 35 
7 to 40 percent. Actually, even higher, because there is less 
8 data on duration of untreated psychosis and bipolar disorder. 
9 Q So the duration is a fairly significant factor, the 
10 grandiose delusions, treating grandiose delusions themselves, 
11 thatfs a significant factor? 
12 A Yes, both. 
13 Q There was something I wanted to ask you about. It 
14 has been said today it is difficult to do research on people 
15 who don't want to be medicated. Have you been experienced or 
16 read any research on those types of people? 
17 A I have over 100 peer-reviewed articles in the 
18 literature that I have coauthored. I would say half of them 
19 are exactly on this topic. One of my books is called I'm Not 
20 \ Sick. I Don't Need Help. How to Help Persons with a Serious 
21 Mental Illness Accept Treatment. Half of that book is how to 
22 do involuntarily treatment. It is a step-by-step manual, tells 
23 the reader, whether they are a clinician or family member, how 
24 to do involuntary treatment in all 50 states. A lot of 
25 experience with involuntarily treating and a lot of experience 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Dr. Amador, isn't it true that nowhere in this book 
3 do you say at a certain point treatment is hopeless? 
4 A I am not saying that here today, either, but you are 
5 right. I am very hopeful about treatment. 
6 Q I believe that there was some testimony from you that 
7 if a person has had a psychotic disorder that has been 
8 untreated for a year their prognosis is going to be very, very 
9 poor? 
10 A Twenty or 30 percent is not hopeless, in my mind. 
11 Frankly, if there was a 5-percent chance I would do everything 
12 in my power to convince a patient to take medication if they 
13 have never been on it, absolutely. Untreated psychosis is a 
14 bad thing. I stand by everything that I have ever said about 
15 that. And that's not the question I have been asked to address 
16 here today. 
17 Q In fact, everything in your book is about getting 
18 these people medication? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q The mentally ill? 
21 A Absolutely. 
22 Q And there is even chapters that talk about 
23 involuntary commitment? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q If the mentally ill person has gotten into a state 
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where things are that bad, involuntary commitment is something 
you help the reader to assess? 
A Yes, recognizing the Harper criteria, danger to self, 
giving them exactly the steps they need to take to 
involuntarily — who to call, how to maintain a relationship 
with that person once you have initiated such a proceeding. 
There is research on this, as well. It is very traumatic, 
oftentimes, to treat people against their will. 
Q It sounds like it would also be your opinion, as was 
Dr. Morris', that it is medically appropriate to give 
medication to Ms. Barzee? 
A In a vacuum, yes. If she were my patient, would you 
like me to answer that question? If she were my patient I 
would engage her and work with her and use an evidenced-based 
practice called motivational enhancement therapy with her, 
which I talk about in the book, and try to help her find 
reasons that she might want to try a medication. Maybe her 
reasons have nothing to do with having a mental illness. It is 
a very different approach than the doctor knows best 
psychoeducational approach that she is getting in the hospital 
here, and most hospitals, frankly, from my reading of the 
chart, anyway. So, certainly, as I said a few minutes ago, I 
wouldn't give up hope, no. 
Q And you were talking about what you would do with 
25 Ms. Barzee, and you would engage in motivational enhancement 
1 need? If you are going to do that you better be sitting ready. 
2 Again, I think these doctors are ready to do that. But it is 
3 serious business to force medication against somebody's will, 
4 very serious business. 
5 Q Yet it is something that with some individuals needs 
6 to be considered? 
7 A Absolutely. 
8 Q I wanted to ask you a question about the discussion 
9 that you had about grandiose delusions. Do I take it, then, 
10 that you disagree with Dr. Morris1 testimony that it is not so 
11 much the delusion that is the problem for Ms. Barzee, it is her 
12 preoccupation with the delusion? 
13 A Would you remind me what Dr. Morris said about that. 
14 Q I believe that Dr. Morris and I agreed it is not the 
15 delusion that is the competency concern with Ms. Barzee, it was 
16 her preoccupation with the delusion. 
17 A Yeah, I think I would disagree with that. I think it 
18 is both, but, fundamentally, it is the delusional belief 
19 itself. If there is strong conviction in that belief, there is 
20 no flexibility, like she can consider maybe this isnTt true, 
21 that that core, fixed belief is impairing competency. 
22 Preoccupation with it, as well. And the way that when you were 
23 cross examining Dr. Morris I understood your point is also 
24 impairing competency. Those are two separate issues. 
25 Q Would it be your assessment that anyone who has a 
ADDENDUM B 
United States v. Weston 
Fage 1 of 17 
t £ West Reporter Image (PDF) 
255 F.3d 873, 347 U.S.App.D.C. 145 
Briefs and Other Related Documents 
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Russell Eugene WESTON, Jr., Appellant. 
No. 01-3027. 
Argued May 16, 2001. 
Decided July 27, 2001. 
Government sought order permitting forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to pretrial detainee 
accused of killing guards at United States Capitol, in order to render detainee competent to stand 
trial. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Emmet G. Sullivan, J., 69 
FJ5upp_.2d.99/ issued order. The Court of Appeals, 206_F.3d_9, remanded. On remand, the District 
Court, 134 F.Supp.2d 115, reaffirmed its finding that involuntary treatment was medically appropriate 
and necessary, and detainee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
antipsychotic drugs were medically appropriate; (2) government's interest in bringing detainee to trial 
was "essential state policy"; and (3) forced medication was necessary in order to restore detainee's 
competence, and therefore justified. 
Affirmed. 
Randolph, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion joined by Circuit Judge Sentelle. 
Rogers, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion. 
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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: 
Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause there is a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs/ ' Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221, 110 S.Ct. 
1028,. 108 LEd_.2cL178 (1990). This appeal requires us to decide whether the government may 
administer such drugs to a pretrial detainee against his will in order to render him competent to stand 
trial. 
I. 
On July 24, 1998, an assailant armed with a .38 caliber revolver forced his way past security 
checkpoints at the United States Capitol. He shot and killed Jacob Chestnut and John Gibson, both 
officers of the United States Capitol Police. He shot and seriously wounded Douglas McMillan, also an 
officer of the United States Capitol Police. Russell Eugene Weston, himself seriously wounded by 
gunfire, was arrested at the scene. The federal government indicted Weston on two counts of 
murdering a federal law enforcement officer, one count of attempting to murder a federal law 
enforcement officer, and three counts of using a firearm in a crime of violence. 
The government wants to try Weston for these crimes but is presently unable to do so because the 
district court found him incompetent to stand trial. See (/p/teqf S te lesy^ 
117 (D.D.C.2001); 1 Joint Appendix 45-46 (competency order). The district court accepted the 
conclusion of a court-appointed forensic psychiatrist that Weston suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, 
and that the severity of his symptoms renders him incapable of understanding the proceedings 
against him and assisting in his defense, as required to bring a defendant to trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(a) (statutory competence requirement); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 
S.Ct,„2680, .125 LEd._2d 321 (1993) (constitutional competence requirement). The court committed 
Weston to the custody of the Attorney General "for treatment in a suitable faci l i ty*875 **147 for a 
reasonable period of t ime." 1 Joint Appendix 46; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 
Weston is currently incarcerated "for treatment" at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North 
Carolina. He is not being treated. Rather, he was placed in solitary confinement under constant 
observation when he arrived at FCI Butner and remains there today. The Bureau of Prisons apparently 
placed him in seclusion to "mitigate [his] dangerousness." kKestPac_„134„F.Supp..2d„at_130. As an 
Assistant Director of the Bureau explained, Weston's "mental health seclusion status" is "for very 
vulnerable inmates, and [is] typically ••• reserved for those who present a substantial danger to 
themselves or somebody else---" 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 59. The district court characterized Weston's 
confinement situation as "simply the warehousing of Weston in a psychotic state. I t is not treatment; 
at best it contains dangerousness." 134 F.Supp.2d at 130-31; see also 4 Joint Appendix 103 (Report 
of court-appointed expert that "the field places severe limitations on the use of seclusion in clinical 
psychiatry because [it] is considered to be inherently aversive when used for prolonged periods of 
time."). 
There is treatment available for Weston's illness and its symptoms in the form of antipsychotic 
medication. The parties agree that such medication is likely the only treatment that can mitigate his 
schizophrenia and attendant delusions, and thus restore his competence to stand trial. See Brief for 
Appellant at 5; Brief for Appellee at 12-13. Weston is not currently receiving any such medication 
because, at a time when he was considered medically competent to make a determination, he refused 
them. The district court prohibited the Bureau of Prisons from forcibly medicating Weston without a 
court order. 
After two administrative hearings and two district court hearings, the government obtained an order 
authorizing it to administer antipsychotic medication against Weston's will. See United States v. 
Weston, 69 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.P.C1999). The district court held that forcible medication was 
"medically appropriate" and "essential for [Weston's] own safety or the safety of others." Id. at 118. 
It also found that "the government has a fundamental interest in bringing the defendant to tr ial," but 
determined that the dangerousness holding made it unnecessary to decide whether that interest 
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outweighed Weston's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. See /<l„atJL.18-19, The court declined 
to consider Weston's claim that forced medication would interfere with his right to a fair trial, holding 
it was not ripe. See id._ at.107. 
A panel of this court reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the district 
court's dangerousness finding was not supported by the record. See United Statesy._ Weston, 206 
F.3^_9JpjCJ_Cirs20003 (per curiam). The panel also reversed the district court's determination that 
Weston's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial claim was not ripe, holding that "because antipsychotic 
medication may affect the defendant's ability to assist in his defense, postmedication review may 
come too late to prevent impairment of his Sixth Amendment right." Id. at 14 (citations omitted). The 
panel also directed the district court to consider Weston's argument that medical ethics preclude 
forcibly medicating a defendant to make him competent for trial in a case that might carry the death 
penalty. See id. at 14 n. 3. 
On remand, the district court again held that the Bureau of Prisons could forcibly medicate Weston. It 
concluded that antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate*876 **148 and "essential to 
control and treat Weston's dangerousness to others." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 127, 131. The district 
court also held that the "government has an essential interest in bringing Weston to trial" given "the 
serious and violent nature of the charges, that the immediate victims were federal law enforcement 
officers performing their official duties, and that the killings took place inside the U.S. Capitol amid a 
crowd of innocent bystanders." Id. at 132. The court concluded that forcible medication would not 
interfere with Weston's right to a fair trial, and could in some respects enhance his ability to exercise 
that right by improving his mental function. See id. at 132-38. 
In this appeal, Weston claims that administering antipsychotic drugs against his will violates his Fifth 
Amendment due process liberty interest "in avoiding unwanted bodily intrusion" and implicates his 
right to a fair trial. See Brief for Appellant at 37-38. In earlier stages of this case, Weston asserted a 
First Amendment right to freedom from compulsory medication and challenged the Bureau of Prisons' 
administrative procedures under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. — He has not raised 
either issue here so we do not consider them. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the 
government's interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial 
overrides his liberty interest, and that restoring his competence in such manner does not necessarily 
violate his right to a fair trial. 
FN1. Weston refers in footnote 9 of his brief to the First Amendment, the Fourth 
Amendment, and "privacy interests" not attributed to any particular part of the 
Constitution. He has supplied no supporting arguments and we therefore will disregard 
his references. See, e.g., Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 
39 (D.CCir.1997). 
II. 
IIIIIIIIL IIIIIIIIL H E9 
[1] [2] The due process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication may 
be "significant," but it is not absolute. See Kansasy._ Hendricks, J>21 U.S.J346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 
138 LEd.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739", 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 
697 (1987); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 LEd.2d 28 (1982). In 
Washington v. Harper and later in Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
government may, under certain circumstances, forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a 
prisoner or criminal defendant despite his liberty interest, provided such medication is "medically 
appropriate." See Riggins v, Nevada, .504 U.S.. 127, 135,-112.S.Ct. 1810, 118 LEd.2d 479 (1992); 
Washington v. Harper. 494 U.S. 210, 220, 222-23 & n. 8, 226-27, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 LEd.2d 178 
(1990). With respect to Weston, there is no doubt that this latter condition has been met. 
Whether a proposed course of action is "medically appropriate" obviously depends on the judgment of 
medical professionals. See Harper,_494 U.S.„at 231, 2_33.:.3.4 .^110S,Ct._1028; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 
255 F.3d 873 
322123,.102 S.Ct. 2452; Vitek.y.. 3ones,_ 445 U,S..48P,.495,„10.0 S.Ct, .1254, 63_LEd,2d 552 (1980); 
Parham v. J. ft., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 609, 99 S.Ct. 2493f 61 LEd.2d 101 (1979); Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S.. .418, 429,.99 S,.Ct, 1804, 60 LEd.2d 323 (197.9). The district court relied on several 
experts in concluding that "[antipsychotic medication is the medically acceptable and indicated 
treatment for Weston's illness." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 122. 
The district court measured the medical appropriateness of antipsychotic medication by examining the 
capacity of antipsychotic drugs to alleviate Weston's schizophrenia (the medical benefits) against their 
capacity to produce harm **149 *877 (the medical costs, or side effects). See id. at 123. Numerous 
experts testified that antipsychotic medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's 
illness.E1^ While there are potential side effects,—3 the professional judgment of the medical experts 
was that "each of these potential side effects is generally manageable." Id. at_123,125. The short of 
the matter is that the record leaves no basis for doubting the district court's conclusion that 
antipsychotic medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's condition. 
FN2. See, e.g., 8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 59 (Dr. Johnson testifying that the standard of care 
for treating schizophrenia is antipsychotic medication); 4 Joint Appendix 103 (Report of 
Dr. Daniel stating that "[antipsychotic medication is essential to the treatment of 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Psychotherapy without antipsychotic 
medication is not considered to be an effective treatment for schizophrenia."); 7/25/00 
p.m. Tr. at 11 (Dr. Deprato's testimony that " [ t ]he diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia is 
appropriately treated with antipsychotic medication"); 7/26/00 a.m. Tr. at 64 (Dr. 
Zonana's testimony: Question: "To your knowledge is there any hospital in this country 
that would not attempt to treat this patient with antipsychotic medication to address the 
illness as you understand it based on the materials that you've had an opportunity to sit 
in and review?" Answer: "Well, I think that is the standard treatment of choice these days 
[and] if you don't offer and try to use medication in a situation like this, it is negligent."). 
FN3. There are two types of antipsychotic medication-the "typicals" and the "atypicals." 
The government proposed to use typicals, which are an older generation of 
antipsychotics. The district court found: 
Typical antipsychotics can produce the following side effects: (1) dystonic or acute 
dystonic reactions, which involve a stiffening of muscles; (2) acuesthesia, which is 
restlessness or an inability to sit still; (3) Parkinsonian side effects, which can slow an 
individual; (4) tardive dyskinesia, which causes repetitive, involuntary tic-like movements 
of the face, eyelids, and mouth; (5) neuroleptic malignant syndrome ("NMS"), which 
causes temperature control problems and stiffness; and (6) perioral tremor, referred to 
as rabbit syndrome because of the mouth movements associated with it. 
134 F.Supp.2d at 123. The atypicals, which the government has not ruled out, are newer 
and "have a more favorable side effect profile." See /d.__.at .124., The court found that side 
effects from atypicals include: (1) Agranulocytosis, which could result in death but for 
which "there is a highly effective monitoring system to prevent this result"; (2) sedation; 
(3) weight gain; (4) seizures; and (5) problems with lipid metabolism. See id. I t appears 
that antipsychotic medications could also alter Weston's demeanor, emotional affect, and 
cognitive function. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 49-50; 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at 22-24; 7/26/00 
a.m. Tr. at 62-63. 
Weston claims that the ethical obligations a doctor owes a patient preclude forcible medication in 
these circumstances. As he sees it, "the question whether the administration of antipsychotic 
medication is medically appropriate is different from the question whether treatment is therapeutically 
appropriate." Brief for Appellant at 18. Thus, " [ t ]he context in which the forced medication issue 
arises and the state purpose are relevant considerations for the physician to decide whether it is 
ethical to force-medicate." Id. If the state's purpose is to make one competent for trial, Weston 
argues, then a doctor must consider alternatives such as civil commitment. See id. These ethical 
norms purportedly derive from the Hippocratic Oath and the 1982 United Nations Principles of Medical 
rage / o i 1 / 
Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners 
and Detainees against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
See Brief for Appellant at 19. 
No source of legal authority-neither Bureau of Prisons regulations, nor the statute governing 
treatment of incompetent pretrial detainees, nor the Constitution*878 -makes **150 medical ethics 
relevant to the determination whether the government can forcibly medicate Weston. Even if a 
particular doctor had ethical objections to administering antipsychotic drugs to a non-consenting 
patient, this would not undercut the consensus in the medical profession that antipsychotic 
medication is the medically appropriate response to Weston's condi t ion.— 
FN4. Defense counsel also claims that Weston's decision while he was medically 
competent not to take antipsychotic medication makes such medication medically 
inappropriate. See Brief for Appellant at 45. We shall assume arguendo that Weston's 
previous decision reflects his current informed judgment (which of course is unknowable). 
Nonetheless, withholding of consent does not make a treatment medically inappropriate. 
In Harper, for instance, the inmate reportedly said he "would rather die than take 
medication," 494 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (Stevens, J., separate opinion), but the 
Court approved the treatment as in the inmate's medical interest. 
A. Mitigating Dangerousness 
A pretrial detainee's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication gives way when 
the medication is essential to mitigate the detainee's dangerousness: "Nevada certainly would have 
satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that 
treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive 
alternatives, essential for the sake of [the pretrial detainee's] own safety or the safety of others." 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810. The district court applied this standard to Weston's 
situation and twice found antipsychotic medication medically appropriate and essential for his safety 
or the safety of those around him. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 121-32; Weston, 69 F.Supp.2d at 
107:10. 
On appeal of the district court's first decision, a panel of this court found the record insufficient to 
support application of the Riggins standard. Much of the evidence focused on the government's 
competency-for-trial justification-which the district court did not adopt-and the limited evidence 
supporting the dangerousness justification "indicates that in his current circumstances Weston poses 
no significant danger to himself or to others." Weston, 206 F.3d_at 13. The panel relied on the 
testimony of a Public Health Service physician assigned to FCI Butner that "[g]iven [Weston's] 
immediate containment situation, I feel confident that we can prevent him from harming himself or 
others under his immediate parameters of incarceration where he is in an individual room with limited 
access to anything that he could harm himself with or harm anyone else with, and he remains under 
constant observation." 2 Joint Appendix 121; Weston, 206 F.3d at 13. The panel concluded that 
involuntary medication was not "essential" for safety and instructed the district court that * [ i ] f the 
government advances the medical/safety justification on remand, it will need to present additional 
evidence showing that either Weston's condition or his confinement situation has changed since the 
hearing so as to render him dangerous." Id. 
On remand, the district court received additional evidence showing that Weston's condition had 
deteriorated. In view of this evidence, the court once again found that Weston posed such a danger 
that medicating him was warranted. We think the previous panel's decision likely precluded that 
finding. That panel held that Weston's situation in confinement-total seclusion and constant 
observation-obviated any significant danger he might pose to himself or others. There appears no 
basis to believe that Weston's worsening condition renders him more dangerous *879 **151 given 
his near-total incapacitation. Weston remains in seclusion under constant observation. Absent a 
showing that Weston's condition now exceeds the institution's ability to contain it through his present 
state of confinement, the prior decision appears to preclude a finding of dangerousness. See LaShawn 
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Ay. Barry, 87__F.3d.1389, 1.393, 1395(D.C.Cir.l996) (en banc) (law-of-the-case and law-of-the-
circuit doctrines). We need not determine whether our concurring colleague's different interpretation 
of the previous panel's decision is correct in view of our affirmance of the district court's competency-
for-trial ground of decision. See Concurring Op. of Rogers, J., at 889-90. 
B. Restoring Competence to Stand Trial 
In Riggins, the Court prescribed the conditions sufficient for a dangerousness justification, but 
explicitly declined to "prescribe ••• substantive standards" for determining when other government 
interests override a pretrial detainee's liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication. See 
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136, 112 S.Ct. 1810; see also Weston, 206 F.3d at 12-13 (also declining to 
prescribe substantive standards). The Court did, however, suggest that the governmental interest in 
restoring a pretrial detainee's competence to stand trial could override his liberty interest: "the State 
might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with [antipsychotic 
medication] by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of [the pretrial detainee's] guilt or 
innocence by using less intrusive means." Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810. 
"The substantive issue involves a definition of the protected constitutional interest, as well as 
identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it ." Harper, 494 
U.S. at 220. 110 S.Ct. 1028 (quoting Af/7/s v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299r 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d 
1_6_(1982)) (internal brackets omitted); see also Fpucha.y._XouisjarLaj_504JJ.$. 7_1, 116, l_12.S.Ct. 
1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The standard of review determines when 
the Due Process Clause ••• will override a State's substantive policy choices, as reflected in its laws."). 
Weston argues that the appropriate substantive standard is strict scrutiny and that involuntary 
medication must be "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest." See Brief for 
Appellant at 36-37; accord United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947r 957 (6th Cir.1998^ (strict 
scrutiny applies to determination whether governmental interest in medicating nondangerous pretrial 
detainee to make him competent for trial outweighs liberty interest); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 
1396 (10th Cir.1984) (requiring use of "less restrictive alternatives"); see also Kulas v. Valdez. 159 
F.3d 453, 455 (9th Or. 1998) (using heightened scrutiny under Riggins)) United States v. Sanchez-
Hurtado, 90 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1055 (S.P.Cal.1999) (same); Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 
165-66 (D.C.1992) (as amended on rehearing) (applying Riggins and requiring "a showing of 
overriding justification and medical appropriateness"). The government argues for an arbitrary and 
capricious standard like that employed to review administrative agency action. See Brief for Appellee 
at 22-27; accord Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (applying reasonableness standard to 
forcible medication of prisoners to mitigate dangerousness); Weston, 206 F.3d at 14-15 (Henderson, 
J., concurring); United Statesy. Charters, 863 F.2d .302, .306.(4th Ci.r..l_988) (en banc) (liberty 
interest "is protected against arbitrary and capricious actions by government officials"); United States 
v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir.1999) ("under Charters,, the determination*880 **152 of 
whether to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee ••• rests upon the professional judgment of 
institutional medical personnel, subject only to judicial review for arbitrariness"); United States v. 
Keeven, 115 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1137 (E.P.Mo.2000) (following Morgan); cf. Jurasek v. Utah State 
Hosp., 158F.3d 506,.511 (10th Cir,1998) (applying Harper's reasonableness standard to civilly 
committed patient); see also Charters, 863_F.2d.at 312.-13 (professional judgment standard from 
Youngberg v. Romeo); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir.1997) (same). 
The Supreme Court denied that it had adopted a strict scrutiny standard in Riggins. See Riggins, 504 
U.S. at 136, 112 S.Ct. 1810. It also appeared not to apply a reasonableness test or its various 
analogues: arbitrary and capricious, rational basis, or exercise of professional judgment. Rather, the 
opinion's language suggests some form of heightened scrutiny: the emphasis on the severity of 
infringement antipsychotic drugs impose on an individual's liberty interest, see id. at 134, 112 S.Ct. 
1810; the reasoning that "forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent 
a finding of overriding justification," id. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (emphasis added); the statement that 
medicating to mitigate dangerousness must be "essential" and that the trial court must consider "less 
intrusive alternatives," id.; and the criticism of the district court's failure to find that "safety 
considerations or other compelling concerns outweighed Riggins' [liberty] interest," id. at .136,. 112 
S.Ct. 1810. 
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[3] We think the appropriate standard is the one the Court set forth in the penultimate 
paragraph where it noted the lack of a "finding that might support a conclusion that administration of 
antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy----''Id. at 138r 112 
S.Ct. 1810. Although that paragraph addressed trial prejudice, it outlines the standard the state failed 
to meet in ascertaining whether a governmental interest outweighs a right to avoid antipsychotic 
medication. Accordingly, to medicate Weston, the government must prove that restoring his 
competence to stand trial is necessary to accomplish an essential state policy.---
FN5. The district court held the government to a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of 
proof. See 1.3.4 F._Supp.2d atJ121 A.n.._12. Neither party challenges this determination. 
1 . The Essential State Policy in Adjudicating Criminality 
Preventing and punishing criminality are essential governmental policies. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that preventing crime is a compelling governmental interest. See Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253 f 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 LEd.2d 207 f l 984 ) ; United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 739 f 749-
50, 107 S.Ct, 2095 /„95.LEd.2d 697.(1987). This interest lies not just in incapacitating dangerous 
criminals, but also in demonstrating that transgressions of society's prohibitions will be met with an 
appropriate response by punishing offenders. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62, 117 
S1Ct,„2072/„ 138 LEd,2d.50:L(1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 7 1 , 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 
LEd.2d 437 (1992). The Court has repeatedly adverted to the government's "compelling interest in 
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law/ ' Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426, 
106 S.CL1135, 89 L.E.d.2d 410 (1986); accord Texasy. Cpfcfi,„5_32 U,S..162, -_«-, 121 S,Ct. 1335* 
1343, 149 LEd.2d 321 (2001); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 202, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 
294 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181. I l l S.Ct. 2204, 115 
LEd,2d„ 158.11991); *881 * * 153 Richardson y. Marsh, 481U.S. 200,_210,__107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 
LEd.2d 176 f l 987 ) ; Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
The Court in Riggins recognized the strength of the government's policy in adjudicating criminality 
when it stated that the government "might" be able to involuntarily medicate a defendant if " it could 
not obtain an adjudication of [his] guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means," 504 U.S. at 135, 
112_.S^Ct,_.1810/ and when it cited Justice Brennan's statement that "Constitutional power to bring an 
accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of'ordered liberty7 and prerequisite to social justice and 
peace," id. at 135-36, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 
L.Ed.„2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). We do not believe the Court's use of "might" reflects 
any tentativeness about whether the government could ever justify medicating to restore competence 
to stand trial. If that were what the Court had in mind we doubt that it would have included the 
statement. We read "might," rather, as indicating that the interest in adjudicating criminality is not 
necessarily an essential state policy under all circumstances. Cf. Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960-61 (no 
compelling interest in trying man accused of sending a threatening letter; factors relevant to this 
determination include seriousness of the offense, whether the pretrial detainee is dangerous, and 
whether the detainee will be released if not tried); Khiem, 3X2 A,26_at 176 & n,_ 1 (Ferren, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Whereas the District may have a compelling state 
interest in force-medicating Khiem [to try him for murder], the District will not necessarily have such 
an interest in force-medicating pretrial detainees charged with lesser crimes."). 
[4] We need not decide under what circumstances trying and punishing offenders is not 
"essential." The government's interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals reaches its 
zenith when the crime is the murder of federal police officers in a place crowded with bystanders 
where a branch of government conducts its business. The Court made the point in Salerno: "While the 
Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened 
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when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer 
for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow 
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest." 481 U.S., a„t.750, 107 S.Ct 
2095; see also Khiem, 612 A.2d at 167; but see Bee v. Greaves. 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th 
Cir.1984). The statutory sentences for the crimes Weston is accused of committing-life in prison and 
death-reflect the intensity of the government's interest in bringing those suspected of such crimes to 
trial. See 18JU,S,C_§§__1Ill, 1.114. 
Weston concedes that in "the ordinary case, the strength of the government's interest in trying a 
defendant accused of first degree murder is undisputed," but argues that when "the government 
seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant in order to try him, however, the case is no longer ordinary, 
because presumptions against forced medication have deep roots in the law." Brief for Appellant at 
43. This argument is a reprise of the medical ethics point we considered and rejected in determining 
whether antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate. It has no more purchase here. The 
"presumption" against forced medication goes to the importance of Weston's constitutional right to 
refuse antipsychotic drugs (which we agree is substantial), not to the nature of the government's 
countervailing interest. 
We also do not believe that the "governmental interest in medicating a defendant * 882 **154 in 
order to try him is diminished ••• by the option of civil commitment." Note, Riggins v. Nevada: Toward 
a Standard for Medicating the Incompetent Defendant to Competence, 71 N.C. L.REV. 1206, 1223 
(1993). The civil commitment argument assumes that the government's essential penological 
interests lie only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. I t ignores the retributive, deterrent, 
communicative, and investigative functions of the criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that 
offenders receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover 
what happened through the public mechanism of trial. Civil commitment addresses none of these 
interests. In Weston's case, civil commitment would be based on his present mental condition, not on 
his culpability for the crimes charged: "criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses ••• is 
a distinct issue from his competency to stand tr ial." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739, 92 S.Ct. 
1845, 32 LEd.2d 435 (1972); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(f) ("A finding by the court that the 
defendant is mentally competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of 
his insanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for 
the offense charged."). 
2. Involuntary Medication is Necessary and there are no Less Intrusive Means 
The sole constitutional mechanism for the government to accomplish its essential policy is to take 
Weston to trial. See U.S. CONST, amend. V (no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due 
process). Antipsychotic medication is necessary because, as the district court found, "antipsychotic 
medication is the only therapeutic intervention available that could possibly improve Weston's 
symptom picture, lessen his delusions, and make him competent to stand tr ial ." Weston, 134 
F.Supp.2d at 132. The government cannot "obtain an adjudication of [Weston's] guilt or innocence by 
using less intrusive means." Riggins, 504 u.s. at 135, 112 S_.Ct 1810. 
£5] Although Weston does not propose any alternative means, he claims that the fit between 
involuntary medication and the government's interest is not sufficiently tight in two respects. First, he 
argues that the medication will not restore his competence to stand trial because he is not likely to 
respond to it. Second, he contends that the medication's mind-altering properties and likely side 
effects will prejudice his right to a fair trial such that the government could not lawfully try him even 
if his competence were restored. Either way, the argument goes, there is an insufficient probability 
that forcible medication will satisfy the government's interest. 
We will treat what Weston styles the "narrow tailoring" requirement of strict scrutiny as an attack on 
the "necessity" of antipsychotic medication. In determining whether a governmental interest overrides 
a constitutional right, courts examine not only the nature of the right and the strength of the 
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countervailing interest, but also the fit between the interest and the means chosen to accomplish it. 
This inquiry entails a predictive judgment about the probable efficacy of the means to satisfy the 
interest. In the terms of this case, antipsychotic medication may not be "necessary" if its use will not 
permit the government to try Weston. 
That antipsychotic medication must be necessary to restore Weston's competence to stand trial does 
not mean there must be a 100% probability that it will produce this result. As the Court has 
recognized, "necessity" may mean "absolute physical necessity or inevitability" or "that which is only 
convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end *883 **155 sought." 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.f 492.U.S. 490, 515 n. 13, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 LEd.2d 410 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 476-77, 109 S.Ct 3028r 106 LEd.2d 388 (1989). Even narrow tailoring in strict scrutiny 
analysis does not contemplate a perfect correspondence between the means chosen to accomplish a 
compelling governmental interest. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206-10, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 
119 LEd.2d 5 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
The government has established a sufficient likelihood that antipsychotic medication will restore 
Weston's competence while preserving his right to a fair trial. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960. The 
district court acknowledged that "it is not certain that the medication will restore Weston's 
competency," but "credi ted] the ••• testimony of the mental health experts that this outcome is 
likely." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 132. The government presented evidence that antipsychotic 
medication mitigated symptoms for at least 70 percent of patients. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 108-09; 
8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56; 11/15/00 a.m. Tr. at 57. Dr. Johnson testified that the response rate is 
probably higher with the atypicals. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 108-09. The government also provided 
reason to believe that the probability of restoring competence might be higher in Weston's case 
because of Weston's "relatively little exposure to antipsychotic medication" and his generally positive 
response to the limited medication he received in 1996. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 122; see also 
8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56; 7/27/00 a.m. Tr. at 120-21; 4 Joint Appendix 105 (Report of Dr. Daniel). 
The small possibility that antipsychotic medication will not make Weston competent for trial is 
certainly tolerable considering that antipsychotic medication is the sole means for the government to 
satisfy its essential policy in adjudicating the murder of federal officers. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 207-
08, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (emphasizing that the means chosen is the "only way" to satisfy the state's 
compelling interest). The district court made the most precise predictive judgment it could in this 
context. See 8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that "you are unable to predict in the 
individual case whether that individual will actually respond"). 
Weston points out that there is also a possibility that antipsychotic medication could prejudice his 
right to a fair trial by, for instance, altering his courtroom demeanor, interfering with his recollection 
and ability to testify, and obstructing his right to present an insanity defense. We agree with the 
district court that "[t]here is no reason to conclude, at this time, that involuntary medication would 
preclude Weston from receiving a fair tr ial." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 137. 
The general right to a fair trial includes several specific rights such as the right to be tried only while 
competent, that is, while able to understand the proceedings, consult with counsel, and assist in the 
defense. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 f 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 LEd.2d 103 f !975) . As we 
determined, there is a sufficiently high probability that antipsychotic medication will restore Weston's 
competence to stand trial. The district court found and the evidence indicates that "a strong likelihood 
exists that medication will enhance some of Weston's trial rights, particularly his right to consult with 
counsel and to assist in his defense." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d„at 133.- — 
FN6. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 8 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that " I would really expect him, 
from a mental status standpoint, to be functioning in a much enhanced manner over his 
current psychotic state to the point where I believe his competence could be restored"); 
id. at 9 (Dr. Johnson stating that " I actually firmly believe that treatment with the 
medication will enhance his ability to follow the issues at the tr ial"); 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at 
24 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that "successful treatment would result in a decrease in his 
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delusional thinking, hopefully a resolution of that, an increase in his attention, ability to 
concentrate, and a change in his affect, or the way his mood appears to someone who is 
looking onto the situation. His preoccupation with his delusional system has led me to 
believe at various points that he has also experienced some hallucinatory phenomena, 
and I would expect that to resolve."). 
*884 **156 Another aspect of the right to a fair trial is Weston's right to testify and "to present his 
own version of events in his own words." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U..S. „44,„49, .52, 107 S.Ct .2704,_.97 
L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). The defense is concerned that the medication might affect Weston's memory and 
his capacity to relate his delusions and other aspects of his mental state at the time of the crime, 
which in turn "may impair his ability to mount an effective insanity defense." Weston, 206 F.3d at 21 
(Tatel, J., concurring); see also 18 _LLS,_C. § 17 (affirmative defense of insanity). But the record 
contains no basis to suppose that antipsychotic drugs will prevent Weston from testifying in a 
meaningful way. Rather, it indicates that medication will more likely improve Weston's ability to relate 
his belief system to the jury. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 49-51. The benefits of antipsychotic medication 
in terms of Weston's ability to understand the proceedings and communicate with his attorneys 
presumably will also translate into an improved capacity to communicate from the witness stand. And 
although memory loss is a potential side effect, Dr. Johnson testified that she thought "he'd be able to 
remember his belief system." 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 50 (also stating that " I don't think the treatment 
would impact his memory"); see also 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at 4-5 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that " I don't 
expect him to lose the memory of his delusional beliefs as a result of treatment"). 
There is a possibility that the medication could affect Weston's behavior and demeanor on the witness 
stand such that the jury might regard his "synthetically sane" testimony as inconsistent with a claim 
of insanity. As Justice Kennedy put it in Riggins, " [ i ] f the defendant takes the stand ••• his demeanor 
can have a great bearing on his credibility and persuasiveness, and on the degree to which he evokes 
sympathy." Riggins, 504 U.S.. at_l42,112 S.Ct._1810 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We recognize this 
small risk, but we see little basis to suppose that the jury will take Weston's testimony (if he decides 
to testify) as an indication that he must have been sane at the time of the crime, or that he is making 
it up, or that he deserves no sympathy. There is ample evidence of Weston's history of mental illness 
and bizarre behavior; the jury's overall impression of Weston will depend as much on this evidence as 
his testimony. 
The district court also correctly held that a defendant does not have an absolute right to replicate on 
the witness stand his mental state at the time of the crime. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 134. A 
defendant asserting a heat-of-passion defense to a charge of first degree murder does not have the 
right to whip up a frenzy in court to show his capacity for rage, nor does a defendant claiming 
intoxication have the right to testify under the influence. See Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J., 
concurring). There is little meaningful distinction between these cases and medication-induced 
competence to stand trial. Either way, the defendant's mental state on the stand is different from the 
mental state he claims to have operated under at the time of the crime. The tolerable level *885 
**157 of difference no doubt increases in a case like this where there is substantial evidence of 
mental state other than the defendant's present appearance. 
Weston will not have to rely solely on his own testimony to show his state of mind on July 24, 1998. 
Involuntary medication therefore stands little chance of impairing his right to present an insanity 
defense. There is extensive documentation and testimony concerning Weston's delusional system, his 
history of mental illness, and his "behavior, appearance, speech, actions, and extraordinary or bizarre 
acts ••• over a significant period." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 135-36. Multiple experts have examined 
Weston and presumably may testify. Many of these examinations no doubt related to his trial 
competence, but "[ t ]he tapes and psychiatric reports ••• document Weston's delusional state over 
several years." Id. at 135. There is also a taped interview in which Weston discussed his delusional 
beliefs with the Central Intelligence Agency. See id. at 135_n._22. Given the wealth of expert and lay 
testimony and other documentation the district court described, see id. at 135-36, Weston's insanity 
defense does not stand or fall on his testimony alone. 
A third trial right that could be implicated by antipsychotic medication is Weston's right to be present 
at trial in a state that does not prejudice the factfinder against him. See Estelle v._ Williams^ 425 U.S. 
rage iJ ol 17 
501^503:04, 96 S5Ct. 1691, 48.LEd.2d 126 (.1976); Illinois_v.. Allen, 397 U.S..337, 338^.344, 90 
S.Ct. 1057, 25 LEd.2d 353 (1970). To the extent the medication alters Weston's demeanor, 
courtroom behavior, or reactions to events in the courtroom, it may cause the jury to see Weston in a 
state that might seem inconsistent with a claim of insanity. It could also produce a flattened 
emotional affect that could convey to the jury a lack of remorse, a critical consideration if this case 
proceeded to sentencing. 
Here again the record indicates that medication will likely enhance rather than impair Weston's right 
to a fair trial. Dr. Johnson stated that medication "will alter [Weston's demeanor] to the extent that it 
will be more a return to his baseline non-psychotic state. I would anticipate he would have less 
blunting or flattening of his affect. He would be able to respond more appropriately from an emotional 
standpoint with his facial expression than he is now/' 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 8; see also 7/25/00 a.m. 
Tr. at 22-24 (Dr. Johnson agreeing with the proposition that, with medication, Weston's "expressions 
potentially could be more appropriate to the context of what's occurring in the courtroom"; also, her 
testimony that "[i]t is the patient who is over-medicated or whose side effects are not managed who 
would demonstrate an increased lack of responsiveness"). 
The possibility of side effects from antipsychotic medication is undeniable, but the ability of Weston's 
treating physicians and the district court to respond to them substantially reduces the risk they pose 
to trial fairness. The district court found that Weston's doctors can manage side effects in a number of 
ways: "the Court credits the testimony of the government experts and Dr. Daniel, the independent 
expert, that the side effects of medication are manageable through adjustments in the timing and 
amount of the doses, and through supplementary medications." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 137; see 
also 11/15/00 a.m. Tr. at 125 (Dr. Daniel's testimony that antipsychotic medications have side effects 
but "[generally they can be treated or an adjustment made in the medication, or the medication 
replaced with a different one. There's generally a way to deal with the side effects."); 4 Joint 
Appendix 102 (Statement in Dr. Daniel's report*886 **158 to the district court that "the side effects 
can most often be managed or an alternative course of treatment provided to the benefit of the 
patient. General experience with antipsychotics, particularly the newer medications, indicates that 
given their benefits they are reasonably safe and well-tolerated."). As the Court wrote in Harper, the 
"risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by 
medical professionals." 494 U.S. at 233, 110 S.Ct. 1028.mz 
FN7L Antipsychotic drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed their side 
effects in Riggins. There is a new generation of medications having better side effect 
profiles. See Weston^ 134„F.Supp,2d at 134 (citing Justice Kennedy's concurrence and 
writing that "[a]dvances in the primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies 
make such side effects less likely"); Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins, Involuntary 
Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update, 11 No. 4 HEALTH 
LAWYER 12, 13 (May 1999) ("[I]n light of the progress made in the development of new 
antipsychotic medications since the Supreme Court's Riggins decision in 1992, the courts 
should revisit this issue with an open mind---- [Because of new atypicals,] the fear of side 
effects should not weigh heavily in the decision whether to treat pretrial detainees or 
civilly committed persons with antipsychotic medication against their will when that 
treatment is medically appropriate."). Although the government presently plans to 
medicate Weston with the older generation of typicals, it could switch to the newer 
atypicals if side effects from the typicals threaten to impair his right to a fair trial. The 
district court analyzed the side effects of both. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 123-25. 
Dr. Johnson testified that Weston cannot be treated with atypicals unless he agrees to 
take them orally. See 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 108-09. The parties dispute whether Weston 
would so agree. When Weston originally withheld consent to antipsychotic medication, he 
indicated that he would comply with court-ordered medication. See 5/28/99 a.m. Tr. at 
3. 
The district court also has measures at its disposal: "If Weston is medicated and his competency is 
restored, the Court is willing to take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to ensure that his 
rights are protected. This may include informing the jurors that Weston is being administered mind-
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altering medication, that his behavior in their presence is conditioned on drugs being administered to 
him at the request of the government, and allowing experts and others to testify regarding Weston's 
unmedicated condition, the effects of the medication on Weston, and the necessity of medication to 
render Weston competent to stand tr ial ." Weston,. 134.„F„._Supp„..2d at_137. Weston is free to propose 
other options. 
There is a very high probability that involuntary medication will serve the government's essential 
interest in rendering Weston "competent to stand trial in a proceeding that is fair to both parties." 
Brandon,. 158 F,3d at 954 . £ y s Given the lack *887 **159 of alternative means for the government 
to satisfy its essential policy, we cannot demand more. 
FN8. Although the bulk of Weston's fair trial argument relates to the narrow tailoring 
aspect of his Fifth Amendment substantive due process argument, he makes a fleeting 
reference to an independent right to a fair trial in arguing for strict scrutiny: "Weston's 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial are also at stake because the forced 
administration of antipsychotic medication may 'have a prejudicial effect on [Weston's] 
physical appearance at tr ial ' and have an adverse effect on his 'ability to participate in his 
own defense.' " Brief for Appellant at 37. To the extent this cursory reference suffices to 
raise this claim, this is not the occasion to evaluate it. Whether antipsychotic medication 
will impair Weston's right to a fair trial is best determined when the actual effects of the 
medication are known, that is, after he is medicated. (This is in contrast to the narrow 
tailoring component of Weston's bodily integrity claim, which requires a predictive 
judgment now.) As Judge Tatel stated in the previous panel opinion, "the difficulty 
inherent in predicting how a particular drug will affect a particular individual may well 
lead the district court to conclude that it cannot make this determination about Weston 
without first medicating him. In that event, I see no reason why the potential for side 
effects would preclude the district court from ordering medication, provided that, should 
Weston become competent to stand trial, the district court conducts a second hearing to 
determine the extent to which any side effects Weston is actually experiencing might 
affect his fair trial rights." Weston, 206 F.3d at.21 (Tatel, J., concurring). The district 
court stated that it "will conduct subsequent evidentiary hearings" on this point. Weston, 
134 F.Supp.2d at 138; see also United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264-65 (4th 
Cir.1999). 
I I I . Guardian ad Litem 
Weston also appeals the district court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem. The district court 
concluded that it lacked authority to appoint a guardian and expressed uncertainty about what 
function a guardian would perform if appointed. See 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 2-3. 
We need not decide whether the court had discretion to appoint a guardian and, if so, whether it 
abused that discretion in declining to exercise it. The issue is not relevant to the outcome of this case. 
If the guardian consented on Weston's behalf, the government presumably may medicate him. See 
Reply Brief for Appellant at 24-25 (stating that a guardian "would effectively stand in Weston's shoes" 
and that "Weston's counsel also explained at a hearing that a guardian could take the position that 
the guardian should do as the guardian saw fit with Weston-which would include allowing 
medication"); see also 7/27/00 a.m. Tr. at 108-09. If the guardian withheld consent, we are in the 
same position as without a guardian: the government's interest in restoring Weston's competence to 
stand trial outweighs his liberty interest. If the guardian issue is otherwise relevant, Weston has failed 
to show it. 
>}c * * * * ^ : 
Because antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and is necessary to accomplish an essential 
state policy, the district court's order permitting the government to forcibly medicate Weston is 
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Affirmed. 
RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge SENTELLE joins, concurring: 
I write separately because I believe United States v. Weston, .206 R3d 9 (D.C.Cjr.2000), our first 
decision in this case, may have embodied a serious error. 
Concluding that Weston was not sufficiently dangerous to warrant forcibly medicating him, the panel 
wrote that "in his current circumstances Weston poses no significant danger to himself or to others." 
Weston, 206 F.3d at 13. This was so because Weston was confined to a room, under constant 
observation and had no access to anything he could use to harm himself or others. See id. The 
upshot, the panel concluded, was that " [ i ] f the government advances the medical/safety justification 
on remand, it will need to present additional evidence showing that either Weston's condition or his 
confinement situation has changed since the hearing so as to render him dangerous." Id. 
This standard puts the government in an unnecessary quandary. If Weston were no longer confined to 
a room and under constant surveillance, he would be dangerous and, presumably, could be 
medicated. However, because the government cannot medicate him while he is carefully confined-and 
therefore, not dangerous-it cannot release him into the general pre-trial detention population without 
incurring substantial risks. The result: the *888 **160 government is all but forced to keep Weston 
in isolation, a condition almost everyone agrees is detrimental to Weston's long-term mental health. 
The statutes-18 U.5.C. §§ 4241-4247-provide a far different standard for dangerousness than the 
prior panel's decision, and represent not only the good judgment of Congress and the President, but 
also the Judicial Conference of the United States which "after long study by a conspicuously able 
committee, followed by consultation with federal district and circuit judges," proposed the legislation. 
Greenwood y. United States, _350.U_.S- 366^323,76 S.Ct 410, 100 LEcL 412.(1956.). Under § 4246, 
a person is to be held and treated if "his release would cause a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another person or serious damage to property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (italics added). Thus, 
the question on Weston's first appeal should not have been whether he was dangerous given the 
manner in which he was confined, but whether he was dangerous as a general matter, that is, if he 
were released from strict confinement and observation. 
Our concurring colleague proposes a different reading of the prior panel's decision. Because of the 
problems just discussed, I hope her view eventually prevails even though the language of that 
opinion, quoted above, does not seem to support her. 
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
I write separately on two points: the findings necessary for forcible administration of medication in a 
pretrial context, and the determination of dangerousness to support such governmental intrusion. 
First, following the instruction in Rigginsy. Nevada, 504 U._S_.127, 112 S.Ct. 1810,. l_18.LEd.2d 47.9 
(1992), the court applies a "form of heightened scrutiny," Opinion at 880, in considering a number of 
factors for balancing the interests of the government and the defendant. Succinctly put, to medicate 
Weston against his will, "the government must prove that restoring his competence to stand trial is 
necessary to accomplish an essential state policy." Opinion at 880. The substantive analysis that the 
court employs encompasses, however, at least three distinct determinations. To allow the 
government forcibly to medicate a defendant prior to trial with antipsychotic drugs, the district court 
must find that: (1) an "essential state policy" is at issue, Riggins,_ 504 U.S. at .138, 112_S_Ct 1810; 
(2) "treatment with antipsychotic medication [is] medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive 
alternatives, essential for the sake of [the defendant's] own safety or the safety of others," or 
essential to enable an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or innocence, id. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810; 
and (3) the defendant's due process rights are protected. See id. at 137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1810. 
The district court on remand made these three determinations. See United States v. Weston, 134 
F.Supp.2d 115, 138 (D.D.C.2001) ( Weston III). On appeal, this court addresses the first 
255 F.3d 8V j 
determination under the heading 'The Essential State Policy in Adjudicating Criminality." Opinion at 
880. It addresses the second and third determinations under the heading of "Involuntary Medication 
is Necessary and there are no Less Intrusive Means." Id. at 882-83. The court provides a separate 
analysis of each determination. Id. at 883-87. 
Keeping these determinations separate is important because the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that a defendant's liberty interests may outweigh the State's interest. Although indicating that even 
"a substantial probability of trial prejudice" can be justified if "administration of antipsychotic 
medication [is] necessary to accomplish an essential state policy," *889 **161 Riggins, 504 U.S. at 
13.8j_112_S.Ct. 18_1_Q, the Court has suggested that the defendant's liberty interests would prevail 
where, for example, the antipsychotic medication impairs the defendant's "ability to follow the 
proceedings" or to present a defense. Id. at 137, 112 S.Ct. 1810; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 
U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 
S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). In such circumstances, the government would have the option of 
seeking civil commitment of the defendant. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment); see generally 18_U.S_.C_ §§.4241-4247; D.C.Code 1981__§§.21-_541 to 
21-551. For the reasons set forth by the court, the due process concerns relating to evidence of 
Weston's mental state and to his competency to stand trial are attenuated. See Opinion at 883-87. 
Second, the court eschews review of the district court's determination on remand that forced 
medication was justified because of Weston's dangerousness to himself or others. The court views our 
decision in United States y._ Weston, 206.F.3d.9 (P.CCir,2000) (per curiam) ( Weston II) to have 
"likely precluded" a finding of dangerousness in the absence of evidence that "Weston's condition now 
exceeds the institution's ability to contain [his dangerousness] through his present state of 
confinement." Opinion at 879. To suggest that Weston II created a "standard" other than the 
traditional dangerousness standard applicable to pretrial detainees is to misread Weston II. See 
Concurring Opinion at 887-88; see also Opinion at 879; 18 U.S.C 5 4246fd^f2); 28 CF.R. 6 549.43. 
The court in Weston II did not "put[ ] the government in an unnecessary quandary." Concurring 
opinion at 887. The court's language must be read in context. In stating that " [ i ] f the government 
advances the medical/safety justification on remand, it will need to present additional evidence 
showing that either Weston's condition or his confinement situation has changed since the hearing so 
as to render him dangerous," Weston II, 206 F.3d at 13, the court was addressing the insufficient 
evidence of dangerousness in the record before it to support a finding that involuntary medication 
was "essential" for Weston's safety or the safety of others. See id. That evidence showed that as then 
confined in isolation by the government, Weston did not, in the opinion of the government's treating 
psychiatrist, pose a significant danger to himself or others. See id. What was missing from the district 
court record was a "searching inquiry into whether less intrusive alternatives [to forced medication] 
would have been sufficient to control any potential danger posed by Weston to himself and to others." 
Id. at 18 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment). The court forewarned, however, that to rely on 
dangerousness as a basis for forced medication, the government on remand would need to present 
evidence that showed more than that when confined Weston did not pose a significant danger to 
himself or others. See id. at 13. The government thus remained free to present evidence about the 
risks of danger that would be created if Weston was not confined in isolation and that less intrusive 
alternatives to forced medication would be ineffective to control his dangerousness. 
The record on remand indicates that the parties and the district court understood what "additional 
evidence" of dangerousness was required by Weston II; none has suggested that the government 
confronted a "quandary." See Br. for Appellee at 28, 38, 41-42; see also Opinion at 879. Expert 
medical testimony was offered on Weston's dangerousness in and out of seclusion, distinguishing 
between Weston's state of mind and his ability to act on his delusions. See, e.g., Test, of Dr. Daniel, 
*890 **162 4 JA at 27-73. To the point, the government now argues in its brief that Weston's 
"seclusion from the general population is not an 'alternative' to involuntary medication because it has 
done nothing to quell [his] dangerous behavior," Br. for Appellee at 42, and that " 'prolonged use' of 
seclusion 'brings risk of detrimental effects to the psychological well-being of the patient,' and is 
'inherently aversive.' " Id. at 43 (quoting expert medical testimony presented on remand). Hence, the 
government's "quandary" is a creation of the concurrence. 
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OPINION BY: JAMES P. JONES 
OPINION: 
[*697] OPINION AND ORDER 
By: James P. Jones 
Chief United States District Judge 
In this criminal prosecution, the government has 
moved for permission to involuntarily medicate the de-
fendant in order to render him competent to stand trial. 
For the foregoing reasons, and subject to the strict condi-
tions set forth herein, I will grant the government's mo-
tion. 
I. BACKGROUND. 
The defendant Herbert G. Evans is charged with 
forcibly interfering with a United States Department of 
Agriculture employee and threatening to murder a magis-
trate judge. Evans suffers from paranoid schizophrenia 
and it is agreed that he is incompetent to stand trial. Ev-
ans has refused antipsychotic medication to restore his 
competency and in 2003 the government moved for au-
thorization to medicate him involuntarily. After a hear-
ing, and applying the four-part test articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 
123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L Ed. 2d 197 (2003), I granted the 
government's [**2] motion. United States v. Evans, 
2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 4204, No. L02CR00136, 2004 
WL 533473 (W.D.Va. Mar. 18, 2004). 
Evans appealed, arguing that the first, second, and 
fourth prongs of Sell were unmet, nl The Fourth Circuit 
vacated this court's decision and remanded for further 
proceedings. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th 
Cir. 2005). In its opinion, the court of appeals disagreed 
with Evans regarding Sell's first prong, holding that there 
was adequate evidence that the government's prosecuto-
rial interest was sufficiently important to involuntarily 
mediate Evans. Id. at 238, 239-240. However, it found 
erroneous my factual conclusions regarding the second 
and fourth Sell prongs-whether the government had 
adequately demonstrated that its prosecutorial interest 
was significantly furthered by involuntary medication, 
and whether involuntary medication was medically ap-
propriate. It held that the government had failed to ar-
ticulate with sufficient particularity the medications it 
planned to administer to Evans, the potential side effects 
particular to Evans' medical condition, and [*698] a 
plan for responding to the onset of such side effects. Id. 
at 240-41. [**3] 
nl The third prong, whether medication is 
necessary, is not at issue here. I originally re-
solved the necessity requirement in the govern-
ment's favor, and that finding was not challenged 
on appeal. 
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit "emphasized that 
[the Sell] principles require an exacting focus on the per-
sonal characteristics of the individual defendant and the 
particular drugs the Government seeks to administer." 
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United States v Baldovinos 434 F 3d 233 240 n 5 (4th 
Cu 2006) (charactenzmg Evans decision) 
Following remand, the government submitted to the 
court a new forensic evaluation prepared at the Federal 
Medical Center m Butner, North Carolina ("Burner") In 
response to the Fourth Circuit's finding of a lack of 
specificity, the new evaluation (the "Butner Report") 
detailed the process by which the government proposed 
to involuntarily medicate Evans, and included the par-
ticular medications and dosages to be used, the methods 
of administering those drugs, and a treatment [**4] plan 
for responding to side effects In reply to the Butner Re-
port, Evans submitted a report co-authored by Margaret 
S Robbms, M D , and Thomas E Schacht, Psy D , 
("Robbins Report"), which included objections to the 
course of treatment proposed m the Butner Report and 
rebutted the analysis regardmg the cited literature re-
view Both reports are summarized m greater detail here-
after 
On February 10, 2006, an evidentiary hearing was 
held m obedience to the directions of the court of appeals 
relating to the second and fourth Sell prongs Testifying 
at that heanng were Byron Herbel, M D , a psychiatrist at 
Butner, for the government, and Drs Robbins and 
Schacht for the defendant The parties have timely sub-
mitted additional briefing, and the issues are now ripe for 
decision 
II THE FORENSIC EVALUATIONS 
The Butner Report 
I begm by setting out the treatment plan proposed by 
the Butner Report Butner proposes treatmg Evans first 
with long-acting risperidone (Risperdal Consta), a sec-
ond-generation antipsychotic medication, to be adminis-
tered by injection In order to determine Evans' ability to 
tolerate risperidone, Butner proposes administering small 
test doses of [**5] short-acting risperidone over the 
course of two days one-half milligram on day one, and 
one milligram on day two In administering the initial 
doses, Butner would first attempt to persuade Evans to 
mgest the oral doses voluntarily, if he refuses, Butner 
proposes to restrain Evans, insert a nasogastric tube, and 
administer the test doses in that manner 
If Evans tolerates the test doses with no adverse re-
action, Butner proposes beginning injections of twenty-
five milligram doses at two-week intervals, momtormg 
Evans for therapeutic benefit and medication side effects 
Sustamed release of the medication would begm ap-
proximately four weeks after the initial injection The 
report predicts that symptoms would begin to improve 
after six to eight weeks, though an adequate antipsy-
chotic trial would only be reached after three to four 
months of continuous treatment Serum risperidone lev-
els could be obtained to provide guidance for dosage 
adjustments up to fifty milligrams every two weeks If 
after an adequate medication tnal Evans' symptoms con-
tinue to be resistant, then treatment with a substitute an-
tipsychotic medication should be considered 
The Butner Report provides that during [**6] the 
risperidone treatment, Evans would be momtored for 
neuromuscular and metabolic side effects, the latter be-
ing more prevalent with second-generation drugs The 
report provides a specific plan for administering adjunc-
tive medication to manage any neuromuscular side ef-
fects that mamfest, [*699] including treatment with an 
alternative antipsychotic should the side effects persist 
despite adjunctive treatment Also during the nspendone 
treatment, Evans would be momtored for negative effects 
on his diabetes, using the standard Butner protocols in-
cluding weighing, body mass mdex recordmgs, finger-
stick glucose, and serum lipid measure, all on a monthly 
basis Evans would also be counseled on relevant life-
style modifications should side effects arise 
If it became necessary to discontinue the nspendone 
treatment, the Butner Report suggests a first alternative 
plan usmg long-actmg halopendol (Haldol Decanoate) m 
an injectable form, implementing a similar test dose 
strategy as with the risperidone treatment Initially, Ev-
ans would be administered test doses of one milligram 
for two days, either in oral form or through injection, 
dependmg on Evans' cooperation A nasogastric tube is 
[**7] not indicated for administration of halopendol 
Barring any adverse event following the test doses, Ev-
ans would be administered twenty-five milligrams of 
long-acting halopendol at two-week intervals With se-
rum halopendol momtonng, the dose could be mcreased 
not to exceed 150 milligrams in a four-week penod 
The Butner Report proposes a second alternative 
treatment plan, which would require Evans to cooperate 
consistently n2 with daily mgestion of an alternative sec-
ond-generation oral antipsychotic medication, anpipra-
zole, m daily 7 5 milligram doses After an observation 
period, the report provides that the dose would be in-
creased by increments of 7 5 milligrams as clinically 
mdicated up to forty-five milligrams daily A third alter-
native treatment plan would require Evans' consistent 
cooperation m ingesting daily doses of second-
generation antipsychotic ziprasidone m twenty milligram 
oral dose5 daily After a period of observation, the report 
provides that the dose could be mcreased by mcrements 
of twenty milligrams up to an eighty milligram dose 
twice daily 
n2 The Butner Report predicts that Evans' 
cooperation is unlikely 
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[**8] 
In addition to the treatment plan and the literature 
review summarized in more detail below, the Butner 
Report offered an extended history of Evans' mental 
health treatment, including two instances of involuntary 
medication using haloperidol injections in the 1980s, 
although treatment records noting specific doses and 
duration are sparse. Other records show that Evans was 
hospitalized three times at Southwestern State Hospital. 
In 1976, he received no medication; in 1979, he was 
treated with Mellaril, though his delusions persisted 
throughout treatment. In January 1981, Evans took Ser-
entil for four days, but was then forcibly medicated in 
February with "calmer" results that were recorded only 
as long as his brief hospitalization. Evans advised that 
during these hospitalizations, he experienced serious 
neuromuscular side effects, including drooling, pacing, 
and jaw locking and characterized the experience as "tor-
ture." 
In 1984, during Evans' last hospitalization, he was 
again treated with Mellaril, resulting in minimization of 
his delusional beliefs. It is the 1984 successful treatment 
history upon which the Butner Report relies to support its 
opinion that Evans' symptoms are not [**9] treatment-
resistant. 
In arguing that the involuntary medication of Evans 
meets the Sell standard, the Butner Report provides a 
number of empirical data studies indicating a substantial 
success rate with involuntary medication for patients like 
Evans. Two studies by Ladds and colleagues support the 
premise. The Ladds studies involved a [*700] group of 
sixty-one incompetent pretrial defendants referred for 
involuntary psychotropic treatment. Of the forty-five 
who were involuntarily medicated, eighty-seven percent 
were rendered competent. 
The Butner Report also cited guidelines of the 
American Psychiatric Association ("APA") issued in 
2004 for treating schizophrenia, which provide a number 
of statistics related to treatment of schizophrenia. The 
guidelines provide that first-episode patients are more 
responsive to treatment, multi-episode patients are 
slightly less responsive, and all patients are subject to 
relapse within one or two years. Ten to thirty percent of 
patients will have little to no response to treatment, and 
an additional thirty percent exhibit some response. Fac-
tors relevant to Evans that predict poor treatment re-
sponse include male gender, severe hallucinations and 
delusions, [**10] history of side effects, and long dura-
tion of untreated psychosis. The Butner Report contends 
that applying the APA guidelines relevant to Evans sug-
gests a probability of competency restoration between 
ninety percent in the best case and forty percent in the 
worst case. An additional study provided that group 
probabilities do not speak to individual cases given the 
unpredictability of the illness itself. 
The report also cited a study by Lasser, which con-
sidered the favorable response of fifty-seven elderly in-
dividuals with schizophrenia or a related disorder to 
treatment with long-acting risperidone. Treatment re-
sulted in significant improvement of symptoms with a 
"low rate" of adverse side effects. 
The Butner Report cited a record review not yet 
published by Stelmach, involving twenty-one patients 
with delusional disorder admitted to Butner for compe-
tency restoration. Sixteen of the twenty-one were re-
stored to competency after treatment with antipsychotic 
medication. No patients met the particular profile of Ev-
ans. 
The report contains a number of additional studies, 
summaries of which are not necessary here. 
The Butner Report offered empirical data rebutting 
Dr. Robbins' opinion [**11] that Evans' delusions are 
impervious to medication. While the Butner physicians 
found no data on patients specifically matching Evans' 
profile, there was data supporting a more optimistic out-
come than that suggested by Dr. Robbins. A study by 
Tirupati and colleagues described one-year treatment 
outcomes for forty-nine patients with schizophrenia left 
untreated for many years. In that case, forty-seven per-
cent of patients having been ill for five years or less had 
good outcomes, while only six percent of those untreated 
for over fifteen years had good outcomes. However, the 
the data sample was unlike Evans because Evans has a 
high level of functioning despite his long history of ill-
ness. The report contends that the data from all the stud-
ies cited, when viewed in light of the characteristics dis-
tinguishing Evans from the study samples and his history 
of positive response to treatment with medication, indi-
cates that treatment is more likely than not to restore him 
to competency. 
In brief, the Butner Report responds to the Fourth 
Circuit's remand order by setting out a carefully detailed 
initial treatment plan followed by a number of alterna-
tives, a plan for monitoring and responding [**12] to 
side effects generally and related specifically to Evans' 
medical condition, and a literature review supportive of 
its position. 
The Robbins Report. 
The Robbins Report offered a number of objections 
to the Butner Report's proposed course of treatment, and 
offered alternative [*701] analysis regarding the studies 
cited by that report. Dr. Robbins' arguments are summa-
rized briefly below. 
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With regard to the specific treatment plan proposed 
for Evans, Dr Robbms opined that antipsychotic medica-
tion is unlikely to restore his competency She believes 
that the long duration of his delusions without treatment, 
when combined with the fact that the substance of Evans' 
delusions correlates so accurately with his current legal 
status, results m delusions that would be particularly 
treatment-resistant It is also Dr Robbms' position that, 
when taking all of the relevant factors mto account, and 
m particular the negative factors listed in the APA Prac-
tice Guidelines, n3 Evans' delusions are likely impervi-
ous to medication In support of that assertion, Dr Rob-
bins looks to the Tirupati and Silva studies cited by the 
Butner Report Tirupati, which does not address delu-
sional patients, shows [**13] that long duration of un-
treated psychosis, at least twenty years m Evans' case, 
produces "dismal" prospects for treatment with medica-
tion Silva's study produced seven delusional patients, 
none of whom responded to medication 
n3 As detailed above, factors suggesting an 
unfavorable treatment outcome for Evans mclude 
the fact that Evans is male, the long duration of 
Evans' untreated psychosis, his long-standmg 
negative attitudes about treatment, the seventy of 
his delusions, a history of side effects, and the 
provision of medication in an adversarial context 
In response to the government's contention that the 
1984 positive treatment response proves that Evans' de-
lusions are not impervious to medication, Dr Schacht 
testified that when the medical history is viewed as a 
whole, one observes many more instances m which 
medication was not successful m treating Evans' symp-
toms Further, Dr Schacht mdicated that "fair remis-
sion," as indicated in the treatment notes, does not neces-
sarily correlate with other [**14] treatment notes indi-
cating persistent delusions, and has no consistent medical 
meanmg 
Dr Robbms did not offer objections to the particular 
medications prescnbed m the Butner Report, although 
she strongly opposed the use of a nasogastric tube for the 
administration of the test doses BothDr Robbms'report 
and her testimony at the hearmg indicated that the nsks 
mvolved in inserting a nasogastric tube, particularly on 
an uncooperative, combative patient, far outweighed its 
possible benefits Dr Robbms recommended that a test 
dose be administered in a soluble tablet form, which dis-
solves immediately upon contact with a moist surface 
and provides minimal risk of harm to an uncooperative 
or combative patient 
The Robbms Report also criticizes the particularity 
with which the Butner treatment plan proposes to re-
spond to side effects relatmg to Evans' high blood pres-
sure and diabetes, particularly m light of the fact that side 
effects most prevalent with second-generation antipsy-
chotics, like risperidone, are metabolic in nature The 
proposed treatment plan provides m general terms that it 
will monitor for side effects using a standard protocol, 
and will refer Evans to [**15] medical management 
should his diabetes worsen However, Dr Robbms pomts 
out that the plan fails to set out the specific conditions 
which, if reached, would or should result in discontinu-
ing treatment or other measures n4 
n4 For example, the Robbms Report queries 
the specific actions to be taken should Evans' 
diabetic condition, currently managed by oral 
medication, worsen to the pomt of requiring daily 
insulin injections 
The Robbms Report further criticizes the treatment 
plan's lack of specificity regardmg [*702] a response to 
negative side effects relating to Evans' hypertension 
Particularly, the report's concerns are based on the poten-
tial for low blood pressure caused by simultaneous 
treatment with risperidone and Evans' antihypertensive 
medication Also criticized is the Butner Report's failure 
to consider the possibility of mcreased hypertension in-
duced by stressful encounters related to Evans being 
medicated against his will 
The Robbms Report also critiques the Butner Re-
port's statements regardmg [**16] possible side effects 
caused by treatment with antipsychotic medication With 
regard to the Lasser study involving the use of long-
acting risperidone on elderly patients, Dr Robbms pomts 
to the fact that while the study reports a "low rate" of 
side effects that rate is never explicitly quantified in the 
report Dr Robbms contends that the court should reach 
its own conclusion regarding whether the side effect in-
cidence m Lasser was, m fact, low Further, Dr Robbms 
contends that Evans is distinguishable from the patients 
mcluded in the Lasser study because, m relevant part, 
those patients had been previously stabilized on oral 
risperidone for at least two weeks Accordmg to Dr 
Robbms, the Lasser study speaks most clearly about pa-
tients who, unlike Evans, have already tolerated and 
benefited from voluntary treatment with antipsychotic 
medication The report also states that, generally, the 
possibility of side effects capable of hindering Evans' 
defense cannot be adequately predicted m advance 
Generally and m response to the literature review 
proffered by the Butner Report, the Robbms Report and 
related hearing testimony assert that the individuals in-
cluded m the [**17] group research studies cited by the 
Butner Report lack important similarities to Evans' par-
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ticular diagnosis and symptoms, namely that Evans car-
ries a delusional diagnosis rather than a diagnosis of gen-
eralized schizophrenia. Additional factors lacking from 
group research are Evans' long duration of untreated psy-
chosis, long-standing negative attitudes toward treat-
ment, and the administration of medication in an adver-
sarial manner. Further, the report disputes the Butner 
Report's equation of "positive treatment response" with 
"restoration of competency," arguing that medicating 
Evans may result in positive responses, e.g., reduction in 
agitation, that have no impact on his overall competency. 
With respect to the particular reports cited, the Rob-
bins Report rebutted the Butner Report's conclusions 
regarding the Ladds studies, noting a lack of comparison 
to a control group, lack of report on the duration of un-
treated psychosis, and an inflated success rate, among 
other criticisms. Dr. Schacht's testimony at the hearing 
offered a similar criticism. The Robbins Report offers 
additional specific critiques to each of the studies cited 
by the Butner Report, which I will not detail here. 
[**18] 
On the whole, Dr. Robbins believes that antipsy-
chotic medication is unlikely to return Evans to compe-
tency, and that the Sell prongs therefore cannot be met. 
I next review the evidence in light of the legal stan-
dard articulated by the Supreme Court and make the nec-
essary findings of fact. 
III. ANALYSIS. 
Sellv. United States. 
In Sell v. United States, 539 US. 166, 123 S. Ct. 
2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003), the Supreme Court clari-
fied the legal standard the government is required to 
meet in seeking the involuntary medication of a defen-
dant for the purpose of rendering the defendant compe-
tent to stand trial. It [*703] held that the government 
may involuntarily medicate a defendant so long as (1) the 
government prosecutorial interest is "important," (2) in-
voluntary medication will "significantly further" that 
interest, (3) involuntary medication is necessary to fur-
ther that interest, and (4) involuntary medication is 
"medically appropriate." Id. at 180-81. While the Su-
preme Court in Sell failed to articulate a standard of 
proof to govern consideration of this sort of claim, the 
parties do not seriously dispute that the appropriate stan-
dard requires the government to prove its [**19] case by 
clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, I will 
evaluate the government's case under that standard. 
Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit's remand, only the 
second and fourth prongs are relevant to these proceed-
ings. I will review each in turn. 
"Significantly Further." 
Sell's second prong requires the government to show 
that involuntary medication will "significantly further" 
its prosecutorial interest. Involuntary medication "sig-
nificantly furthers" the government's prosecutorial inter-
est when it is (1) substantially likely to render the defen-
dant competent to stand trial and (2) substantially 
unlikely to produce side effects that will significantly 
interfere with the defendant's ability to assist his counsel 
at trial, thereby rendering the trial unfair. Id. at 181. 
After carefully reviewing the record in this case, I 
find that involuntary medication is substantially likely to 
render Evans competent to stand trial, and is substan-
tially unlikely to produce side effects that will signifi-
cantly interfere with Evans' defense. 
I find persuasive a number of factors contained in 
the Butner Report. The Ladds study, finding an eighty-
seven percent return to competency [**20] by those 
forcibly medicated, is compelling evidence regarding the 
probability of restoring Evans' competency in this case. 
Also persuasive is Dr. Herbel's opinion that Evans' 1984 
positive response to antipsychotic medication n5 after 
twenty years of no treatment suggests that Evans may 
reasonably be expected to have a similar outcome when 
treated again with antipsychotic medication. Relatedly, I 
find convincing Dr. Herbel's opinion that Evans' high 
level of functioning suggests that, notwithstanding his 
years without treatment, he has not suffered a decreased 
response thereof, and that, in his own day-to-day experi-
ence, a patient's negative view of medication is not asso-
ciated with a decreased response to treatment. n6 
n5 The record indicates that in 1984, Evans 
was forcibly medicated with a relatively low dose 
of antipsychotic medication, and that the medica-
tion was successful in restoring his competency. 
n6 At the hearing, Dr. Herbel testified that he 
had personally been involved in eighty involun-
tary medications, although the majority were 
medicated absent the use of force. Dr. Herbel re-
called twenty-two incidents in the last calendar 
year requiring the use of force for involuntary 
medication, of which seventy-seven percent re-
sulted in competency restoration. No forced 
medication in the past year, and only one forced 
medication in thirteen years resulted in an injury 
to the patient. 
[**21] 
Taking all of the factors into consideration, Dr. Her-
bel opined that Evans maintained an estimated seventy to 
eighty percent chance of being restored to competency. 
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Dr. Robbins, testifying on behalf of Evans, admitted that 
even though she believes it unlikely that medication will 
restore Evans to competency, involuntary medication for 
the purpose of restoring competency is appropriate in 
some situations. I find that Dr. Herbel's opinion, [*704] 
when considered in light of the evidence and scientific 
studies produced in the Butner Report, presents clear and 
convincing proof that Evans is substantially likely to be 
restored to competency for trial purposes. 
I also find clear and convincing evidence to support 
the government's assertion that involuntarily medicating 
Evans is substantially unlikely to produce side effects 
rendering him incapable of assisting in his defense. 
While it is apparent from the literature cited by the But-
ner Report that troublesome side effects, mainly meta-
bolic in nature, are common with second-generation an-
tipsychotics, they generally are not so serious as to in-
hibit Evans' assistance with his own defense. During 
treatment, Evans' high blood pressure and diabetes 
[**22] will be closely monitored, but do not add to the 
risk of nor enhance the severity of side effects. Neither 
does there appear to be a strong risk that the subject mat-
ter and deep-seeded nature of Evans' delusions will sig-
nificantly interfere with his defense despite treatment. 
Further, the treatment plan proposed by Butner consis-
tently calls for close monitoring of Evans' response to the 
drugs, as evidenced by the use of test doses, serum level 
testing, and commitment to using the lowest effective 
dose. 
Accordingly, after taking into consideration all of 
the evidence presented in the reports and at the eviden-
tiary hearing, I find that the government has met its bur-
den with respect to Sell's second prong, namely, that 
involuntary medication of Evans will significantly fur-
ther its prosecutorial interest. 
"Medically Appropriate." 
Sell's fourth prong requires a finding that involun-
tary medication is medically appropriate, or in the best 
interest of the patient in light of his medical condition. 
Sell 539 U.S. at 181. Sell counseled that a court should 
consider the specific kind of drug administered, its side 
effects, and its levels of success. Id. 
The Butner [**23] Report specifically considers 
whether involuntary medication is medically appropriate 
under the circumstances and reaches an affirmative con-
clusion that it is appropriate. In support, the Butner Re-
port included an article by Lasser, detailing a study of 
favorable treatment response of long-acting risperidone 
on fifty-seven elderly patients with schizophrenia. 
Treatment resulted in a low rate of adverse side effects 
caused by the medicine. 
Further, as described in detail above and in accor-
dance with the Fourth Circuit's remand, see Evans, 404 
F.3d at 242, the Butner Report proposes in clear, careful 
detail a primary course of treatment with three alterna-
tives, an estimated length of time after which Evans' 
competency would be restored, criteria to be used in de-
termining when treatment should be discontinued, a plan 
for monitoring for possible side effects specific to Evans' 
condition and medical history, and an explanation of the 
benefits and costs of such treatment. I find, with two 
exceptions explained below, that the government's con-
tention that the proposed course of treatment is medically 
appropriate is supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
Dr. Herbel reported [**24] that antipsychotic medi-
cation "is the only intervention that will be likely to re-
store [Evans'] competency to stand trial." (Tr. at 46.) 
Because Evans' has expressed an intent to be uncoopera-
tive with medication, the Butner Report chose a long-
acting antipsychotic, risperidone, in order to reduce the 
necessity for forceful encounters with Evans in adminis-
tering the medication. A second-generation antipsychotic 
was chosen for the first course of treatment in order to 
avoid the neuromuscular side effects Evans [*705] ex-
perienced previously with exposure to haloperidol, 
though both psychiatrists at the hearing testified that the 
past side effects were likely caused by overdosing. 
Risperidone is the only second-generation antipsychotic 
available in a long-acting form. 
As to treatment duration, Dr. Herbel testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that Evans would need to be treated 
with an antipsychotic medication for between four and 
five months in order to restore him to competency. If 
Evans failed to respond within five months, the govern-
ment would seek leave to begin administering an alterna-
tive antispyschotic medication for an additional four to 
five months. Treatment would be discontinued [**25] 
either after two five-month treatment cycles with two 
separate antipsychotics followed by no improvement in 
Evans' condition, or earlier with the onset of intolerable 
side effects. 
As detailed above, the Butner Report clearly sets out 
the side effects that may potentially arise with the use of 
antipsychotic drugs, and describes a specific plan to be 
carried out in monitoring Evans' response to the drugs. 
Because second-generation antipsychotics produce 
metabolic side effects that could potentially affect Evans' 
blood sugar and high blood pressure, both would be 
closely monitored during his treatment. Risk of such side 
effects is reduced due to the fact that the Butner Report 
ruled out using those second-generation antipsychotic 
drugs with the highest propensity for metabolic side ef-
fects. Onset of any side effects would be addressed 
though a doctor-patient meeting and possible drug substi-
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tution. Taken in total, I find that the government's pro-
posals are medically appropriate and supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
The government has failed to meet its burden with 
regard to the proposed use of a nasogastric tube for ad-
ministration of test doses. The Butner Report and testi-
mony [**26] at the hearing propose restraining Evans 
and inserting a tube through his nose into his stomach, 
and administering small, short-acting doses of antipsy-
chotic medication as a means of gauging Evans' toler-
ance of the drug. While sound reasoning supports the 
administration of test doses of risperidone prior to use of 
the long-acting version, the medical appropriateness of 
using a tube for that purpose is not supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. Risks involved in inserting the 
tube include accidental passage into the pulmonary tract 
and perforation of the esophagus, all of which are more 
likely in patients, like Evans, who are uncooperative dur-
ing insertion. Dr. Robbins characterized the risks as "life-
threatening" at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr. at 136.) 
Medical appropriateness is made more questionable in 
light of the fact that risperidone appears to be available 
in an orally disintegrating tablet form. n7 The risks asso-
ciated with the use of a nasogastric tube outweigh the 
benefits of treatment in this case. Accordingly, because 
the government has failed to meet its burden of proof on 
this issue, I find that the test doses of risperidone must be 
administered in soluble tablet [**27] form instead of by 
a nasogastric tube. 
n7 Risperdal M-Tab(R). See 
http://www.risperdal.com/html/ris/consumer/pd_r 
isperidone.xml?article=dosing.jspf 
The government has also failed to meet its burden 
with regard to its proposed response to a worsening of 
Evans' diabetes. Currently, Evans' diabetes can be man-
aged with daily oral medication, which Evans takes vol-
untarily. While the Butner Report sets out a means of 
monitoring [*706] Evans' glucose and insulin levels and 
generally takes into consideration the potential for a 
worsening of Evans' diabetes, the report fails to provide 
in adequate detail the actual steps to be taken should Ev-
ans' diabetes in fact worsen, particularly to the point of 
requiring daily insulin shots. I do not find clear and con-
vincing evidence that the current treatment plan is medi-
cally appropriate with regard to a worsening of Evans' 
diabetes. Accordingly, because the government has 
failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue, I will 
direct that, in the event that Evans' diabetes worsens 
[**28] to the point of requiring daily insulin shots, the 
government must cease treatment with the antipsychotic 
currently in use and return to this court with a new pro-
posal. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For the foregoing reasons and pursuant to the fol-
lowing conditions, the government's motion to involun-
tarily medicate Evans is GRANTED. It is ORDERED 
that the government may involuntarily medicate Evans in 
an effort to restore him to competency subject to the fol-
lowing conditions: 
1. The government may initiate treatment 
with risperidone pursuant to the dosing 
schedule provided in its proposed treat-
ment plan: 
a. The government may 
administer test doses of 
short-acting risperidone; 
b. The government must 
not administer test doses 
using a nasogastric tube, 
but may use short-acting 
risperidone only in an oral 
form or in a soluble tablet 
form; 
c. If Evans tolerates the 
test doses, the government 
may administer long-acting 
risperidone by injection 
pursuant to the dosing 
schedule provided in its 
proposed treatment plan 
for no longer than five 
months. 
2. If risperidone test doses are unable to 
be given, or if risperidone treatment fails 
due to lack of effect on symptoms [**29] 
or the onset of intolerable side effects, the 
government may treat Evans with halop-
eridol: 
a. The government may 
administer test doses of 
short-acting haloperidol in 
the oral or injectable 
forms; 
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b. If Evans tolerates the 
test doses, the government 
may administer long-acting 
haloperidol by injection 
pursuant to the dosing 
schedule provided in its 
proposed treatment plan 
for no longer than five 
months; 
3. If haloperidol treatment fails due to the 
onset of intolerable side effects, the gov-
ernment may initiate treatment with 
aripiprazole pursuant to the dosing sched-
ule set out in its treatment plan. 
4. If aripiprazole treatment fails due to the 
onset of intolerable side effects, the gov-
ernment may initiate treatment with zipra-
sidone pursuant to the dosing schedule set 
out in its treatment plan. 
5. The total course of treatment must not 
last longer than ten months; after ten 
months, all antipsychotic medication must 
cease and the government must return to 
this court with a new proposal. 
6. The government must monitor Evans 
for neuromuscular, metabolic, and other 
side effects during all treatment, and, in 
particular, for side effects related to his 
diabetes [**30] and hypertension. 
7. If at any time during treatment Evans' 
diabetes reaches a level requiring daily in-
sulin injections, all antipsychotic medica-
tion must cease and the government must 
return to this court with a new proposal. 
[*707] 8. The government must not de-
viate from its proposed treatment plan or 
from the directions set forth above with-
out first obtaining permission of this 
court. 
ENTER: April 20, 2006 
/s/ JAMES P. JONES 
Chief United States District Judge 
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OPINION: 
[*736] ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court is the government's second motion 
for authorization to involuntarily medicate defendant 
Lawrence Algere with antipsychotic drugs to restore his 
competency to proceed to trial. For the following rea-
sons, the Court GRANTS the government's motion. 
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
On April 4, 2003, defendant Algere was indicted for 
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon. On May 9, 2003, on a joint 
motion from the government and Algere, the Court ap-
pointed a licensed psychologist, Dr. Emily Fallis at the 
Federal Medical Center at Fort Worth, Texas, to evaluate 
Algere and provide the Court with a written opinion as to 
his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
On September 5, 2003, the resulting written report 
diagnosed Algere with Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated 
[**2] Type, which is characterized by at least a one-
month period in which two or more of the following oc-
cur: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, 
grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative 
symptoms (e.g., emotional flattening and poverty of 
speech). In Dr. Fallis's opinion, Algere was not compe-
tent to stand trial. On September 22, 2003, the Court held 
a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § § 4241 and 
4241, at which counsel for the government, counsel for 
the defense and the defendant were all present. Based on 
the evidence received, the Court found Algere not com-
petent to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence 
and ordered that he be committed to the custody of the 
Attorney General for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(d). The Court also ordered that another written 
opinion as to Algere's competency be prepared after the 
treatment. Algere was admitted to the Federal [*737] 
Medical Center, Mental Health Department, in Butner, 
North Carolina. 
On August 4, 2004, Dr. Carlton Pyant, a licensed 
psychologist, and Dr. Bruce P. Capehart, a licensed psy-
chiatrist at the FMC, submitted a written report reporting 
Algere's progress [**3] and evaluating his condition in 
accordance with the Court's order. Pyant and Capehart 
diagnosed Algere with Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type. 
(Rep. of 8/4/04 at 5-6). The doctors noted that paranoid 
ideation and marked disorganization dominated the ma-
jority of Algere's conversations and that he was intensely 
focused on identifying and preparing for conflict with his 
enemies. (Id. at 3-4). He was also concerned about con-
tracting diseases from his food. (Id. at 5). Algere also 
displayed delusions about the criminal justice system, 
stating that he wishes to plead "not guilty with conflict of 
interest" meaning "statements they have against you are 
not valid." (Id. at 7). Dr. Pyant testified that Algere 
agreed to take Abilify less than five times and then re-
fused it because he did not like how he felt on the medi-
cation, although no objective observations indicated the 
presence of any side effects. The doctors concluded that, 
without treatment with antipsychotic medication, Algere 
remained incompetent to stand trial. (Id. at 6). 
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Because Algere continued to refuse antipsychotic 
medication on a voluntary basis, on August 19, 2004, the 
government moved to authorize the FMC to medicate 
[**4] Algere involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs un-
der the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003). 
On October 14, 2004, the Court denied the government's 
motion because there was no evidence that the proce-
dures of 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 had been followed. That 
section requires that the determination of whether it is 
necessary to forcibly medicate an inmate because he is 
dangerous to himself or others in his current environment 
or to render him competent to stand trial be made in the 
context of an administrative hearing, nl The inmate must 
be given twenty-four hour advance written notice of the 
hearing and be afforded the right to appear at the hearing, 
to present evidence, to be represented by a staff member, 
and to request that witnesses be questioned. 28 C.F.R. § 
549.43(a)(2). 
nl It appears to be the Bureau of Prisons1 po-
sition that, after Sell, this administrative hearing 
procedure is no longer valid when the medication 
is to be administered involuntarily solely for the 
purposes of restoring competency for trial. See 
United States v. Barajas-Torres, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13232, No. CRIM.EP-03-CR-2011KC, 
2004 WL 1598914, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 
2004). The procedure was necessary in this case, 
however, because there had not been any admin-
istrative determination regarding Algere's dan-
gerousness, which Sell requires a court to con-
sider before it authorizes involuntary medication 
on other grounds. 539 U.S. at 181-82. The deter-
mination of an inmate's dangerousness involves 
prison administration and is probably better made 
by prison authorities and medical professionals 
most familiar with the inmate through frequent 
and ongoing clinical observation. See Washington 
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-34, 231, 110 S Ct. 
1028, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990). 
[**5] 
The administrative hearing was held on November 
11, 2004 and resulted in an administrative determination 
that involuntary medication was not warranted on the 
ground that Algere was dangerous to himself or others at 
the FMC, in large part because he is safely housed in a 
single cell in a restricted unit. (Involuntary Medication 
Rep. of 12/2/04 at 7-10). The government does not chal-
lenge the determination that Algere is not dangerous to 
himself or other in his current environment. Algere re-
mains confined at the [*738] FMC, no anti-psychotic 
drugs have been administered, and he remains incompe-
tent to stand trial. 
The government now moves for a second time that 
the Court order that Algere be involuntarily medicated to 
render him competent to stand trial. The Court scheduled 
a hearing on the government's motion and ordered that 
the government submit a supplemental report addressing 
several specific issues regarding the proposed treatment. 
The Court held a hearing on June 29, 2005, at which the 
Court heard testimony from Dr. Pyant and Dr. Jean Zula, 
the chief psychiatrist at FMC, who are both familiar with 
Algere's case. 
The report indicates, and Dr. Pyant testified, that 
Algere's thinking and [**6] speech are consistently dis-
organized, and he continues to express fears about being 
physically harmed by others. On 2/23/05, for example, 
Algere reported suffering from a knee injury caused by 
someone entering his cell and attacking him while he 
slept. (Forensic Addendum of 6/10/05 at 3). He also 
thinks that the judge is working against him, and he feels 
"mistreated by the Court." (Id. at 3-4). Algere fears being 
"locked up on falsified legal documents." (Id. at 3). He 
displays behavioral disorganization such as wearing 
strips of cloth around his limbs because "you never know 
when someone will come up and shank you." (Id. at 3-4). 
Finally, Algere has expressed that he refuses to take an-
tipsychotic medication because he fears: (1) being con-
victed of murder; (2) being vulnerable to his enemies; 
and (3) getting the death penalty. (Id. at 4). Based on the 
evidence produced at the hearing, the Court rules as fol-
lows. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Applicable Law 
An individual has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in rejecting medical treatment. See Washington v. 
Harper, 494 US 210, 211, 110 S Ct. 1028, 108 L. Ed 
2d 178 (1990) (recognizing "a significant liberty interest 
[**7] in avoiding the unwanted administration of antip-
sychotic drugs"); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 US. 127, 134, 
112 S. Ct. 1810, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1992) (repeating that 
there is a constitutionally protected "interest in avoiding 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Such 
medication may be forcibly administered, however, in 
certain circumstances. In Haiper, for example, the Su-
preme Court held that administering anti-psychotic drugs 
against a prison inmate's will does not violate the Due 
Process Clause "if the inmate is dangerous to himself or 
others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical inter-
est." Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. Here, however, the admin-
istrative hearing resulted in a determination that forcibly 
medicating Algere is not warranted on dangerousness 
grounds under Harper because Algere is not dangerous 
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to himself or others in his current prison environment. 
The government does not challenge that determination. 
Accordingly, it is undisputed that this request involves 
the involuntary administration of medication to a non-
dangerous defendant solely for the purposes of restoring 
him to competency for trial, which places it squarely 
within the standard set forth [**8] by the Supreme Court 
in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 
156L.Ed. 2d 197(2003). 
In Sell, the Court concluded that the government 
may involuntarily administer anti-psychotic drugs "to a 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in 
order to render that defendant competent to stand trial" if 
certain conditions are met. Id. at 179. Such treatment is 
authorized only if it "is medically appropriate, is substan-
tially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine 
[*739] the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of 
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to 
further important governmental trial-related interests." 
Id. The Court indicated that this standard requires con-
sideration of four factors: (1) whether important govern-
mental interests are at stake; (2) whether involuntary 
medication will significantly further those interests; (3) 
whether involuntary medication is necessary to further 
those interests; and (4) whether the administration of the 
drugs is medically appropriate. Id. at 180-81. Although 
the Court did not address the standard by which the Gov-
ernment must establish these factors, at least one other 
circuit [**9] has concluded that the government must 
present clear and convincing evidence. United States v. 
Gomes, 387F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004). 
B. Analysis 
1. Important Government Interest 
The first prong of the Sell test requires the Court to 
"find that important governmental interests are at stake." 
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. There is no question that "the gov-
ernment's interest in bringing an individual accused of a 
serious crime to trial is important." Id. At the same time, 
however, special circumstances "may lessen the impor-
tance of that interest." Id. For example, the defendant's 
refusal to take drugs voluntarily may result in lengthy 
civil confinement in an institution for the mentally ill, 
which diminishes the risks usually present in releasing a 
person who has committed a serious crime. Id. Similarly, 
the length of time the defendant has already been con-
fined, for which he would receive credit toward any sen-
tence imposed, might lessen the government's interest in 
prosecuting him. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Finally, the 
government also has an interest in ensuring that the de-
fendant receives a fair [**10] trial. Sell, 539 US at 180. 
To determine whether a crime should be considered 
"serious" for the purpose of forcible administration of 
medication to restore competency, other courts have 
looked to jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 
237 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Leveck-Amirmokri, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7610, No. EP-04-CR-0961-DB, 
2005 WL 1009791, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2005). 
Those precedents indicate that offenses for which a de-
fendant may be sentenced to more than six months im-
prisonment are considered serious enough to invoke the 
right to a jury trial. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 
66, 71, 90 S Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970). Most 
courts which have considered whether an offense is "se-
rious" in the context of forcible medication have also 
followed the recent focus in the jury trial cases on the 
maximum penalty that can be imposed for the offense, 
rather than the defendant's probable sentencing guideline 
range. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (basing determination 
as to seriousness of offense on maximum penalty defen-
dant faced if convicted); Leveck-Amirmokri, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7610, 2005 WL 1009791, at *4 [**11] 
(same); United States v. Kimball, 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 
26586, No. CR03-1025, 2004 WL 3105948, at *3 (N.D. 
Iowa Mar. 23, 2004) (same). But see United States v. 
Barajas-Torres, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232, No. 
CRIM.EP-03-CR-2011KC, 2004 WL 1598914, at *2-3 
and n.4 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (finding right to jury 
trial precedent inapplicable in the context of forcible 
medication because different interests are involved in the 
two analyses and that "the more accurate reflection of the 
seriousness of an offense given the fact-specific analysis 
required by Sell would be the relevant guideline range"). 
[*740] Algere is charged with possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon, a felony carrying a maximum 
term of imprisonment of ten years. The Court concludes 
that this is a "serious" offense. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 
238 (concluding that a felony with a maximum term of 
imprisonment often years is a serious offense "under any 
reasonable standard"). But see United States v. Dumeny, 
295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132-33 (finding that charge under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) for possession of firearm by a 
person previously committed to a mental health institute, 
which carries [**12] a maximum penalty of ten years, 
not sufficiently serious to warrant forcible medication 
because there was no indication of violence in defen-
dant's past). The particular circumstances of Algere's 
offense and his criminal history support the Court's con-
clusion that the offense is a serious one that the govern-
ment has an important interest in prosecuting. Algere 
was previously convicted for manslaughter, a violent 
offense. Previously convicted criminals are prohibited 
from possessing guns to reduce the risk to society that 
they will engage in violent acts. See US. v. Dillard, 214 
F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2000). In light of the risk Algere's 
conduct presents to society, particularly considering that 
he has committed a violent crime in the past, and the 
penalty he faces if convicted, the Court finds that he is 
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charged with a serious crime. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that the government has an important interest 
in bringing Algere to trial. 
The Court must also consider whether special cir-
cumstances, such as the potential for a lengthy term of 
civil commitment that may result from failure to take 
medication voluntarily and the period of confinement for 
which the defendant [**13] would be given credit if 
convicted, lessen the importance of the government's 
interest in this case. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Civil commit-
ment "may mean lengthy confinement in an institution . . 
. that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to 
freeing without punishment one who has committed a 
serious crime." Id. At the hearing, the doctors did not 
provide an opinion about whether Algere would be a 
prospect for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 if 
he were not medicated, indicating that they would have 
to first conduct a risk assessment. n2 Even if Algere were 
a prospect for civil commitment, however, the Court 
finds that this factor does not completely undermine the 
government's strong interest in bringing Algere to trial 
on the serious offense with which he has been charged. 
See id. ("The potential for future confinement affects, but 
does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for 
prosecution."). 
n2 After a defendant who is judged mentally 
incompetent to stand trial has been treated for a 
reasonable period of time, the Court may deter-
mine that the defendant's mental condition has 
not so improved as to permit the trial to proceed. 
18 U.S.C. § 4241. In that case, the defendant is 
subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246. 
Under that section, if the director of the facility in 
which the defendant is hospitalized certifies that 
the defendant is suffering from a mental disease 
or defect as a result of which his release would 
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to an-
other person or serious damage to property of an-
other, the defendant may be committed to the 
custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney 
General releases the defendant to the appropriate 
official of the State in which the defendant is 
domiciled, or, if no State will accept responsibil-
ity, to a suitable facility for treatment until (1) 
such a State will assume such responsibility; or 
(2) the defendant's mental condition is such that 
his release, or his conditional release under a pre-
scribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psy-
chological care or treatment, would not create a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person 
or serious damage to property of another. Id. 
s14] 
[*741] As for Algere's period of confinement, he 
was arrested on March 25, 2003 and has been confined 
about 27 months. The government and the defense agree 
that Algere, based on his criminal history and the crime 
he committed, faces a likely guideline range of 41 to 51 
months if convicted after a trial, or 30 to 37 months if he 
pleads guilty and receives a three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility. The Court has not seen a 
presentence report to be able to assess conclusively what 
Algere's sentence would be under either scenario. Dr. 
Zula testified that the proposed treatment regimen would 
take at least four months to restore Algere to compe-
tency, and defense counsel estimated that he might re-
quire an additional month or two at most to prepare the 
case for trial, adding approximately six months to Al-
gere's confinement. Although the total length of Algere's 
confinement is within counsels' estimated guideline 
range for Algere's sentence if he pleads guilty, the likeli-
hood of which is unknown at this time, the Court again 
finds that this fact does not completely undermine the 
government's interest in prosecuting Algere. See id. Al-
though these special circumstances may lessen [**15] 
the government's interest in prosecuting Algere, they do 
not override it, particularly considering the serious po-
tential consequences of Algere's crime and his criminal 
history. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the gov-
ernment has an important interest in bringing Algere to 
trial on the crime with which he is charged. 
2. Significantly Furthers the Governments Inter-
est 
The second prong of the Sell test requires the Court 
to conclude that "involuntary medication will signifi-
cantly further" the government's interest. 539 U.S. at 181 
(emphasis in original). To do so, the Court must find that 
administration of the drugs is both "substantially likely to 
render the defendant competent to stand trial," and is 
"substantially unlikely to have side effects that will inter-
fere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist 
counsel in conducting a trial defense." Id. Courts have 
found that a 70 percent probability is sufficient to find a 
substantia] likelihood that an anti-psychotic medication 
will restore a defendant to competency, but that a ten 
percent probability is not. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 161-62 
(70 percent sufficient); [**16] United States v. Morris, 
2005 US. Dist. LEXIS 38785 at *13, No. CR.A.95-50-
SLR, 2005 WL 348306, at *3 (D. Del Feb. 8, 2005) 
(same); United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (five to ten percent chance of restored compe-
tence not a substantial likelihood). To satisfy its burden 
on this element, the government must also "set forth the 
particular medication, including the dose range, it pro-
poses to administer to [the defendant] to restore his com-
petency." Evans, 404 F.3d at 241. This is required "be-
cause Sell requires an evaluation of possible side effects, 
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and different atypical antipsychotics will have different 
side effect profiles." Id. at 240 (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 
185 ("Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a 
defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, 
prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish 
the ability to express emotions are matters important in 
determining the permissibility of medication to restore 
competence.")). Finally, the government must demon-
strate that "the proposed treatment plan, as applied to 
this particular defendant, is 'substantially likely' to ren-
der the defendant competent [**17] to stand trial and 
'substantially unlikely' to produce side effects so signifi-
cant as to interfere with the defendant's ability to assist 
counsel in preparing a defense." Id. at 242 (emphasis in 
original); see also United States v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 
2d 163, 164 [*742] (D. Maine 2003) (holding that ade-
quate consideration must be given "to the question of 
likely side effects to this Defendant") (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
Here, the government has set forth a proposed 
course of forcible treatment with injectable short-acting 
Haldol, a first-generation antipsychotic medication, at a 
dose of 5-10 mg per day. (Forensic Addendum of 
6/10/05 at 15). Although the doctors' treatment prefer-
ence is to administer Abilify, a second-generation antip-
sychotic medicine, at an initial dose of 20-25 mg per day, 
Abilify is not available in injectable form and therefore 
cannot be administered involuntarily. (Id.). The dose of 
Haldol would be started at the low end of the range and 
gradually increased to the target range to minimize the 
chance that side effects will emerge. (Id.). Any side ef-
fects would be detected and managed through monitor-
ing, adjustment of the dosage, [**18] switching medica-
tions, or adding a medication to reduce the side effects. 
(Id. at 10, 12). 
a. Substantially Likely to Render Defendant 
Competent to Stand Trial 
Algere's doctors testified that treatment with antip-
sychotic medication such as Haldol is the primary treat-
ment for Algere's particular condition and is substantially 
likely to restore Algere to competence. Dr. Zula's opin-
ion regarding the chances of restoring Algere to compe-
tence with medication is based on three sources. First, 
Dr. Zula cited her experience with medicating patients 
involuntarily at the FMC, many of them schizophrenic, 
which has a 70-80% success rate of restoring them to 
trial competence. Second, Dr. Zula referred to a study of 
involuntarily medicated felony defendants in New York, 
most of whom had schizophrenia, which found that 93 
percent of those medicated had an unequivocally good 
response to the medication and that 87 percent were re-
stored to competency, often with first generation antip-
sychotics such as Haldol. (See Literature Review, revised 
6/20/05 at 2). Finally, Dr. Zula noted that the American 
Psychiatric Association's "Practice Guideline for the 
Treatment of Patients with Schizophrenia" [**19] indi-
cates that more than 70 percent of first-episode schizo-
phrenics achieve remission of psychotic signs within 
three to four months with antipsychotic medication, and 
83 percent achieve stable remission at the end of one 
year. (Id. at 4). Medication does not always work, of 
course. According to the Guidelines, ten to 30 percent of 
patients have little or no response to antipsychotic medi-
cation. (Id.). Dr. Zula admitted that males are generally 
less responsive to treatment and that Algere's resistance 
to being medicated might affect his treatment response, 
but she also noted that the New York study and the 
FMC's success rate are all based on the administration of 
antipsychotic medicine to men. Based on the data and 
her own successful experiences, Dr. Zula maintained her 
opinion that treatment with antipsychotic medication 
generally and Haldol specifically is substantially likely to 
restore Algere to trial competence. 
In addition, the doctors opined, based on published 
studies that antipsychotic medications can reduce apathy, 
improve cognition and improve a patient's insight into 
the fact that he is suffering from a psychotic illness, all 
of which are relevant to the restoration [**20] of compe-
tency. (Forensic Addendum at 7-8). Further, Dr. Zula 
testified that even if the antipsychotic medication only 
partially treated Algere's psychotic symptoms, that 
treatment would give Algere a better chance of overcom-
ing barriers to improving his mental condition. For these 
reasons, the Court [*743] finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the government's proposed treatment plan 
is substantially likely to restore Algere to trial compe-
tence. 
b. Substantially Unlikely to Have Side Effects 
that Will Interfere Significantly with Ability to Assist 
Counsel in Conducting a Trial Defense 
As for side effects from antipsychotic medication 
that might interfere with Algere's ability to assist counsel 
in his defense, the evidence indicates that such effects 
vary widely. n3 (Id. at 8). Dr. Zula testified that common 
side effects from Haldol, the medication the government 
proposes to administer to Algere involuntarily, may in-
clude the following. 
n3 Once Algere's mental state is stabilized, 
the doctors opine that the dosage of any antipy-
schotic medication can be lowered to the mini-
mum dose required to maintain his mental stabil-
ity, which will minimize the risk of side effects. 
(Id. at 12). They also point out that Algere's anxi-
ety may be reduced after his legal proceedings 
are over, which would also allow for a reduction 
in the dosage. (Id.). These considerations regard-
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ing what might happen in the future, however, are 
not relevant to the present purpose of determining 
whether the medication is currently appropriate 
for the purpose of restoring Algere's competence 
to stand trial. 
[**21] 
Sedation Side Effects 
Some amount of sedation is likely to be a side-effect 
of Haldol, along with all other antipsychotic medications, 
but Dr. Zula testified that the effects are not that severe 
and are substantially unlikely to interfere with Algere's 
function and ability to assist counsel. Dr. Zula also testi-
fied that sedation effects are greatest in patients who 
already present apathy as a symptom of their psychosis. 
Because Algere has a "full affect" without apathy as a 
symptom, he is substantially unlikely to experience seda-
tion side-effects that will interfere significantly with his 
ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. The 
doctors indicated that they will monitor for sedation side-
effects and exercise good clinical practice, including 
changing medication, if sedation effects appear. (Id. at 
8). 
Abnormal Movement Side Effects 
The next group of possible short-term side effects 
are abnormal movements. Movement-related side effects 
may include stiffness and tremor, dystonic reactions, and 
akathisia. All first-generation antipsychotics, including 
Haldol, are associated with short-term movement side-
effects, while second-generation [**22] antipsychotics 
are less associated with such effects and generally only at 
higher doses. (Id.). These side effects are generally man-
aged by reducing the dose or, if reducing the dose would 
render the antipsychotic property of the drug ineffective, 
another medication is prescribed to control the effects or 
the antipsychotic medication is changed. (Id. at 8-10). 
Dr. Zula testified that stiffness, tremor and mask-
like facial expression, which occurs in 15 to 50 percent 
of individuals treated with first-generation anti-
psychotics, can be minimized easily through dose reduc-
tion. (Literature Review at 13). If not, benztropine or 
diphenhydramine are prescribed to relieve these symp-
toms. (Forensic Addendum at 10). Acute dystonia, which 
typically manifests as a muscle spasm in up to 10 percent 
of patients treated with first-generation antipsychotic 
medication, is easily and effectively relieved by adminis-
tering an anticholinergic medication. (Literature Review 
at 14). Akathisia, an uncomfortable restlessness or ten-
sion that may produce objective signs of restlessness, 
occurs in 20 to 30 percent of individuals treated with 
first-generation [*744] antipsychotics and is treated by 
reducing the [**23] dose of the antipsychotic, switching 
medications or prescribing an additional medication. (Id. 
at 13). Tardive dyskinesia, the manifestation of writhing 
movements of muscles in the fingers, hands, arms, lower 
extremities, or face and tongue, is a side-effect of long 
term use of first-generation antipsychotic medications at 
a rate of approximately five percent per year after one 
year of use, with 60 to 70 percent of the cases described 
as mild and three to 10 percent described as severe. (Id. 
at 14; Forensic Addendum at 12). Tardive dyskinesia 
does not interfere with cognition, but more severe cases 
might be noticeable in a court proceeding. There is a 
lower risk for development of the disorder, however, in 
patients Algere's age. (Id. at 16). Dr. Zula also testified 
that during trial, these kinds of movement side effects 
could be managed with the administration of another 
medication and, in her opinion, they are substantially 
unlikely to interfere significantly with Algere's ability to 
assist his counsel in conducting a trial defense. 
Endocrinological Side Effects 
The final group of potential side effects are endocri-
nologic side effects. Most first-generation [**24] and 
some second-generation antipsychotics can cause ele-
vated prolactin levels, which may affect the regulation of 
other hormones and manifest in 25 to 50 percent of men 
as erectile dysfunction. (Forensic Addendum at 12). The 
elevated levels "frequently" return to normal when the 
medication dose is decreased or when a different medica-
tion is prescribed. (Id.). 
The metabolic syndrome is another recognized side 
effect of second-generation antipsychotic medications 
and can cause "elevations in weight, blood pressure, 
blood sugar and cholesterol. (Id. at 12). This side effect 
is detected through a mandatory metabolic monitoring 
program at the FMC that includes monitoring weight, 
blood pressure, and serum lipid and glucose levels and 
also involves dietary and exercise educational classes. 
(Id. at 13). If the metabolic syndrome occurs, appropriate 
intervention is prescribed, such as dietary changes, rec-
ommended exercise, medications for high blood pressure 
or cholesterol, or a change in antipsychotic medication. 
(Id.). The doctors point out that these endrocrinologic 
side effects are not the kind of effects that would inter-
fere with Algere's ability to assist counsel in his [**25] 
defense. 
Finally, rare and unpredictable reactions to medica-
tion are always possible. (Id. at 11). For example, neuro-
leptic malignant syndrome, cause by blood pressure in-
stability and the breakdown of tissue toxic to kidneys, 
may be fatal. However, it is rare and can be treated by 
stopping the administration of antipsychotic medication 
and taking supportive measures. (Id.). Medical allergies 
are also possible, but Dr. Zula testified that the medica-
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tion will first be administered in a small test dose to re-
duce the severity of any potential reaction. 
The Court finds that the doctors have carefully con-
sidered the benefits and risks for Mr. Algere's proposed 
treatment and that the proposed treatment with antipsy-
chotic medication is substantially likely to restore Mr. 
Algere's competency to stand trial and substantially 
unlikely to produce side effects that will interfere signifi-
cantly with his ability to aid in his defense. 
3. No Less Intrusive Means 
The third prong of the Sell test requires the Court to 
conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to 
further the government's interests by finding "that any 
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to 
[**26] achieve substantially the same results." Sell, 539 
U.S. at 181. Here, the evidence in the [*745] record 
indicates that no less intrusive treatments are likely to 
achieve substantially the same results. Both doctors testi-
fied that the chances are very slim that Algere will be-
come competent to stand trial without taking antipsy-
chotic medication, because their experience indicates that 
restoration of competency rarely happens without the 
administration of antipsychotic medication. The doctors 
noted that Algere has been at the FMC for more than 
twelve months without significant change in his condi-
tion. (Id. at 13-14). Dr. Zula testified that alternatives 
such as cognitive behavioral therapy are unlikely to help 
Algere because a patient has to be receptive to that kind 
of therapy for it to be effective, and Algere is unwilling 
to re-examine his delusions. In addition, the doctors have 
tried and have been unable to engage Algere in these 
kinds of therapies. The Court therefore finds that less 
intrusive means are unlikely to achieve substantially the 
same results as the administration of antipsychotic medi-
cation. 
The Court is also required to consider whether the 
less intrusive [**27] means of ordering Algere to un-
dergo the treatment, on pain of contempt, might achieve 
the same result. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. Considering that 
Algere remains incompetent, continues to refuse all 
medication and has indicated that he thinks the Court is 
part of a conspiracy against him, a Court order threaten-
ing contempt would be unlikely to affect Algere's will-
ingness to take the medication. See Gomes, 387 F.3d at 
163 (finding that, because defendant repeatedly refused 
all chemical treatment and appeared to believe that the 
judiciary was enlisted in a conspiracy against him, a 
court order was not likely to achieve the same results as 
forcible medication); Morris, 2005 US. Dist. LEXIS 
38785, 2005 WL 348306, at *J (finding that, as defen-
dant was unable to understand his legal situation, a con-
tempt order would be worthless). The Court will never-
theless order that medical personnel treating Algere re-
quest that Algere voluntarily take antipsychotic medica-
tion by oral method before any medication is adminis-
tered involuntarily. The Court concludes that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further the government's in-
terest because it finds that less alternative treatments 
[**28] are unlikely to achieve substantially the same 
results. 
4. Medical Appropriateness 
The fourth prong of the Sell test requires the Court 
to "conclude that administration of the drugs is medically 
appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in 
light of his medical condition." 539 U.S. at 181. The 
government must demonstrate that the particular defen-
dant's individual mental and physical condition have 
been considered in evaluating the proposed course of 
treatment and concluding that it is medically appropriate. 
Evans, 404 F.3d at 240-41. To do so, the government 
must: 
spell out why it proposed (he particular 
treatment, . . . provide the estimated time 
the proposed treatment plan will take to 
restore the defendant's competence and 
the criteria it will apply when deciding 
when to discontinue the treatment, de-
scribe the plan's probable benefits and 
side effect risks for the defendant's par-
ticular medical condition,. . . show how it 
will deal with the plan's probable side ef-
fects, and explain why, in its view, the 
benefits of the treatment plan outweigh 
the costs of its side effects. 
Evans, 404 F.3d at 242. [**29] 
Most of these criteria have already been addressed, 
and the Court finds that the proposed treatment in this 
case is medically appropriate for Algere. Antipsychotic 
medication is the standard treatment [*746] for Algere's 
condition, whether inside or outside of an institution like 
the FMC. (Forensic Addendum of 6/10/05 at 14). Left 
unmedicated, Algere is subject to adverse consequences, 
including increased risk of suicide and increased risk of 
death from natural causes. (Id. at 6). Untreated psychosis 
may even result in permanent damage to a person's brain 
function. (Id. at 7). The proposed treatment has numer-
ous potential positive effects and is expected to signifi-
cantly improve Algere's quality of life. The doctors testi-
fied that Algere lives in a state of constant fear and anxi-
ety, convinced that others are constantly plotting against 
him, and they are unable to convince him otherwise. The 
proposed treatment is likely to relieve Algere of these 
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fears and thereby reduce his anxiety and stress. It is also 
expected to improve Algere's insight into his illness, 
which may result in his acceptance of medication volun-
tarily. Indeed, the doctors testified that the proposed 
treatment is [**30] necessary to alleviate Algere's suf-
fering and is his only chance to function as an independ-
ent member of society. Further, they are unaware of any 
medical condition Algere has that would be worsened by 
the administration of the medication or of any other con-
dition that could explain his psychotic symptoms. (Id. at 
14-15). Any side-effects will be managed as described, 
and Algere will be placed on the metabolic monitoring 
protocol to detect any endocrinologic side-effects that 
may emerge. (Id.). 
The evidence indicates that the doctors have consid-
ered the benefits and potential side effects and concluded 
that treatment with antipsychotic medication is appropri-
ate for Algere. The treatment will involve a careful over-
sight by a psychiatrist, who will prescribe medication at 
an appropriate dosage and monitor Algere for both 
therapeutic and side effects of the treatment. Based on 
the June 10, 2005, report and the testimony of Drs. Pyant 
and Zula, the Court concludes that the proposed admini-
stration of anti-psychotic medication is justified because 
the government has established by clear and convincing 
evidence that it is medically appropriate, is substantially 
unlikely to have side [**31] effects, and, taking account 
of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary to further the 
important governmental interest of rendering Algere 
competent to stand trial for a serious offense. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Having considered the Sell factors and Algere's cur-
rent lack of competence to stand trial, the Court contin-
ues Algere's commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(d)(2)(A) and GRANTS the government's motion to 
have Algere medicated involuntarily to render him com-
petent to stand trial, under the following conditions. 
FMC personnel must provide Algere with a copy of this 
Order and Reasons, explain to him the potential side ef-
fects of Ability, and advise him that Ability must be 
taken orally at appropriate intervals. They must also ex-
plain the potential side effects of Haldol and advise Al-
gere that Haldol is administered by injection at appropri-
ate intervals if he refuses to take Ability orally. All 
medical personnel treating Algere shall request that 
Algere voluntarily take medication orally before each 
and every administration of medication by injection. 
If Algere does not agree to take Ability orally within ten 
days of the date of this Order, [**32] FMC personnel 
are authorized to administer Haldol by injection over 
Algere's objection. 
Algere shall be confined at the FMC for four 
months, or a lesser period if reasonably sufficient to re-
store him to competency. At the end of four months, or 
when Algere's competency is restored if that occurs in 
less than four months, a report shall be filed with the 
Court detailing the [*747] results of the treatment. The 
report must set forth the criteria that are used to deter-
mine whether Algere has been restored to competence to 
stand trial and the result of the application of those crite-
ria to Algere's case. If the doctors conclude that Algere 
has been restored to competence to stand trial, they must 
also set forth what side effects Algere has experienced on 
the medication and how the medication will affect Al-
gere at trial. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 1st day of July, 2005. 
SARAH S. VANCE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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JUDGES: Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO and O'BRIEN, 
Circuit Judges. 
OPINION BY: O'BRIEN 
OPINION: [*1109] O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge. 
Steven Paul Bradley (Bradley) was found incompe-
tent to stand trial. Physicians at a government medical 
facility, however, concluded Bradley's competency to 
stand trial could be restored through treatment with anti-
psychotic drugs. After Bradley's repeated refusal to take 
such medication, the district court, pursuant to the stan-
dards set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 156 
L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S Ct. 2174 (2003), [**2] ordered 
Bradley to be involuntarily medicated in order to render 
him competent to stand trial. Bradley appeals this order. 
Exercising jurisdiction under the collateral order excep-
tion nl to the final order rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 
affirm. 
nl [A] preliminary or interim decision is ap-
pealable as a collateral order when it (1) conclu-
sively determines the disputed question, (2) re-
solves an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and (3) is effec-
tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg-
ment." Sell, 539 US. at 176 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). An order to involun-
tarily medicate falls within the collateral order 
exception. Id. 
[*1110] I. Background 
On January 31, 2003, Bradley was charged by 
criminal complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). til 
The complaint alleged that on the previous day, while 
riding a motorcycle, Bradley lobbed a hand grenade at a 
group of salesmen gathered in the [**3] parking lot of 
Cowboy Dodge, a vehicle dealership in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, because he was dissatisfied with the purchase 
of a truck from the dealership. Attached to the grenade 
was a note which read "I want my $ 26,000.00." In an 
interview with law enforcement, Bradley admitted to the 
incident and also indicated he possessed explosives, ex-
plosive devices and a firearm at his home because he 
believed someone was trying to kill him. Bradley was 
subsequently indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1). n3 Later still, he was charged by criminal 
complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § § 1951(a) n4 and 
924(c)(l)(B)(ii). n5 
n2 "Whoever maliciously . . . attempts to 
damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explo-
sive, any building . . . used in interstate . . . com-
merce or in any activity affecting interstate . . . 
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commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 
years and not more than 20 years . . . ." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 844(0. 
n3 "It shall be unlawful for any person- (1) 
who has been convicted in any court of, [sic] a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting 
commerce, a n y . . . ammunition . . . . " 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1). The penalty includes imprisonment for 
not more than ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
Bradley had a prior federal conviction for posses-
sion with intent to distribute cocaine. 
r**4] 
toms such as those displayed by the de-
fendant. It is possible that an extended pe-
riod of mental health treatment [*1111] 
in an inpatient setting would be sufficient 
to restore his competency. He might well 
exhibit a therapeutic response to a regi-
men of psychiatric medications during 
such a period of hospitalization. Although 
a positive treatment response cannot be 
guaranteed, it is a reasonable expectation 
that Mr. Bradley could be restored to 
competency following a period of treat-
ment in a structured setting, which in-
cluded a regimen of psychiatric medica-
tions . . . . 
n4 "Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of 
any article or commodity in commerce, by . . . 
extortion or attempts . . . so to do . . . shall be . . . 
imprisoned not more than twenty years . . . . " 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a). 
(Appellee App. at 30.) On June 19, the [**6] court, on 
the basis of the report, found Bradley lacked competency 
to proceed to trial. It ordered him recommitted for treat-
ment and further evaluation to ascertain the likelihood he 
would regain competence within the foreseeable future. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 
n5 "Any person who, during and in relation 
to any crime of violence . . . for which the person 
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, 
uses or carries a firearm [destructive device] . . . 
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not less than 30 years." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), 
(B)(ii). 
On February 5, Bradley moved inter alia for a de-
termination of competency to stand trial. On February 
19, the court granted the motion. See 18 U.S.C § 
4241(a). It ordered Bradley committed for a psychiatric 
or psychological examination, with report of the results 
to be submitted to the court. See 18 U.S.C § 4241(b). 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c) (stating requirements for 
report). On June 19, [**5] with the report in hand, the 
court conducted a competency hearing. The report, au-
thored by Dr. Richard L. DeMier, Ph.D., n6 diagnosed 
Bradley with a psychotic mental illness (paranoid 
schizophrenia), averred he was not a danger to himself or 
others within the facility, concluded he lacked compe-
tency to proceed to trial, n7 and stated Bradley's progno-
sis was fair: 
[Bradley] has no appreciable insight into 
the nature or ramifications of [his] disor-
der, and he may be resistant to treatment. 
Nevertheless, psychiatric medications are 
generally able to effectively treat symp-
n6 Dr. DeMier is a clinical psychologist at-
tached to the United States Medical Center for 
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri. 
n7 "Although Mr. Bradley is able to demon-
strate a sound understanding of legal processes in 
the abstract, his psychotic mental illness prevents 
him from applying that information to his own 
case in a rational manner." (Appellee App. at 29.) 
Three days before the competency hearing, the Su-
preme Court decided Sell, in which it held: 
the Constitution permits the Government 
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic 
drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing 
serious criminal charges in order to render 
that defendant competent to stand trial, 
but only if the treatment is medically ap-
propriate, [**7] is substantially unlikely 
to have side effects that may undermine 
the fairness of the trial, and, taking ac-
count of less intrusive alternatives, is nec-
essary significantly to further important 
governmental trial-related interests. 
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Sell 539 U.S. at 179. With this in mind, the court or-
dered that Bradley's further evaluation include an "as-
sessment of the relevant factors" stated in Sell for the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to 
assist Bradley's return to competence. n8 (Id. at 35.) 
n8 The court reserved for itself the legal 
question whether or not involuntary administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs to Bradley would 
"further important governmental trial-related in-
terests." Sell 539 U.S. at 179. (Appellee App. at 
16.) 
Pursuant to the court's instruction, Dr. DeMier con-
ducted his follow-up assessment with the following ques-
tions in mind: 
1. Would Mr. Bradley benefit from treat-
ment with psychiatric medications? 
2. Can Mr. Bradley [**8] be persuaded, 
in consultation with his clinicians, to vol-
untarily submit to treatment with psychi-
atric medications? 
3. If Mr. Bradley is unwilling to voluntar-
ily submit to treatment with psychiatric 
medications, would that treatment never-
theless be considered medically appropri-
ate? 
4. Would the administration of psychiatric 
medications have unfavorable side effects 
which would be substantially likely to un-
dermine the fairness of any trial which 
might occur in this case? 
5. Is treatment with psychiatric medica-
tion likely to return Mr. Bradley to a 
status in which he can substantially assist 
his attorney in his defense? 
(Mat 37.) 
In his report, dated August 22, Dr. DeMier again di-
agnosed Bradley with a psychotic mental illness (para-
noid schizophrenia), averred he was not a danger to him-
self or others within the facility, and concluded he was 
mcompetent to proceed to trial. He answered the ques-
tions posed in the court's order as follows: 
1. "The treatment of choice for a psy-
chotic disorder is antipsychotic medica-
tion. Indeed, antipsychotic medication is 
essential to the effective treatment of psy-
chotic disorders. . . . Other forms of 
treatment, [**9] [*1112] including edu-
cation, psychotherapy, and behavioral in-
terventions, do not address the essence of 
the disorder and are unlikely to be suc-
cessful." 
2. Bradley was unwilling to voluntarily 
submit to treatment with psychiatric 
medications. 
3. "Because treatment with psychiatric 
medications is the intervention of choice 
for Mr. Bradley's condition, it is my opin-
ion, as well as the opinion of the psychia-
try staff at this facility, that treatment of 
his illness with psychiatric medications is 
medically appropriate." 
4. The most common side effects of antip-
sychotic medications are best character-
ized as nuisance side effects, as their ap-
pearance does not entail the risk of serious 
harm, but only inconvenience or discom-
fort . . . . More serious side effects are far 
less common . . . . The vast majority of 
patients report no serious side effects, and 
nuisance side effects can be effectively 
addressed. Some patients report no side 
effects whatsoever. Especially with the 
advent of a newer class of "atypical" an-
tipsychotic medications, the appearance of 
severe side effects is becoming increas-
ingly rare. 
The therapeutic effect [of] antipsychotic 
medication is to improve thinking. [**10] 
Individuals with psychotic disorders typi-
cally have severe impairment in both the 
form and content of their thoughts. This 
may include disorganized thoughts, sen-
sory distortions (such as hallucinations), 
disturbances of emotion, and impairments 
in the ability to think in a rational or se-
quential manner. Treatment of these im-
pairments is likely to enhance, rather than 
undermine, the fairness of any legal pro-
ceeding in which the patient is a partici-
pant. 
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5. It is a reasonable expectation, based on 
the current scientific knowledge in psy-
chiatry and on experiences with many in-
dividuals with similar disorders, that Mr. 
Bradley could be restored to competency 
following a period of treatment in a struc-
tured setting, which included a regimen of 
psychiatric medications. 
(Id. at 41-43.) 
On November 3, the court conducted another com-
petency hearing. Dr. DeMier testified that Bradley's con-
dition had not changed since the assessment contained in 
his August 22 report. 'The only additional information 
that's not in the report again has to do with Mr. Bradley's 
stance since the report was prepared in that he is becom-
ing more and more insistent that he has no mental illness 
and has [**11] voiced strong opposition to taking medi-
cation." n9 (Appellee App. at 58.) The court again found 
Bradley incompetent to proceed to trial. It adopted Dr. 
DeMier's findings, addressed each of the Sell factors and 
ordered Bradley to consult with counsel with an eye to 
voluntarily submitting to the medication. If he did not 
voluntarily submit with ten days, the court indicated it 
would enter an order for involuntary administration of 
the medication. nlO This it did on November 13, 2003: 
[•1113] ORDERED that Defendant, af-
ter further consultation with his attorney 
and the mental health professionals at the 
U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners 
in Springfield, Missouri, shall submit to 
the administration of medication which 
the Court finds is medically appropriate 
and necessary to render Defendant com-
petent to stand trial. If Defendant refuses 
to comply with the Court's order, he will 
be found in civil contempt. 
(Appellant App. at 107.) nl 1 Bradley appeals. 
n9 Bradley himself testified he would refuse 
to voluntarily take antipsychotic medications; it 
was his belief they were not medically indicated. 
[**12] 
nlO The district court stated: 
An appropriate order compel-
ling [the] administration of this 
drug will issue from this Court 
within ten days from today. 
The only order that will issue 
from this Court today, Mr. Brad-
ley, is that you again consult with 
your lawyer privately regarding 
these issues and thereafter volun-
tarily submit to the administration 
of these drugs. The Court orders 
you to do that and in doing so in-
tends to exercise its full civil con-
tempt powers. 
(Appellant's App. at 98.) 
The minute entry in the court's docket char-
acterizes the November 3, 2003 order as follows: 
"Court finds defendant will benefit from antipsy-
chotic medication and orders if the defendant will 
not voluntarily take medication the Court will 
find him in civil contempt and order the involun-
tary administration of medication." (Appellee's 
App. at 104.) 
n i l The court's order is no less one for the 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medi-
cation because its means of enforcement is 
through the exercise of the contempt power of the 
court rather than by forcible medication. See Sell, 
539 U.S. at 181 ("The court must consider less 
intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., 
a court order to the defendant backed by the con-
tempt power, before considering more intrusive 
methods."). The hallmark of an order for the in-
voluntary administration of medication is that it 
breaches the defendant's will. See id. at 171 ("The 
staff sought permission to administer the medica-
tion against Sell's will. That effort is the subject 
of the present proceedings.") (emphasis added). A 
defendant who is unwilling to voluntarily take 
medication, which fairly describes Bradley, is no 
less overcome by a threat to be found in contempt 
than he or she is by being forcibly medicated. 
[**13] 
17. Standard of Proof & Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court in Sell articulated neither a stan-
dard of proof for the Sell factors nor a standard of appel-
late review. In deciding these standards, we bear in mind 
that involuntary administration of antipsychotic medica-
tions implicates a constitutional right. "An individual has 
417 F.3d 1107,*; 2005 U.S. 
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a constitutionally protected liberty interest [under the 
Due Process Clause] in avoiding involuntary administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs-an interest that only an essen-
tial or overriding state interest might overcome." Sell, 
539 U.S. at 178-79 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). The standards we set must weigh this vital con-
stitutional interest in the balance. 
To date, only one circuit has decided the standard of 
proof and the standard for appellate review of the Sell 
factors. The Second Circuit first parsed the Sell factors 
into factual and legal questions. It decided "whether the 
Government's asserted interest is important is a legal 
question." United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 
(2d Cir. 2004), cert, denied, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 125 S. 
Ct. 1094 (2005). We agree, [**14] with one qualifica-
tion. We would expand the parameters of the legal ques-
tion to include whether involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs "is necessary significantly to further 
important governmental trial-related interests." Sell, 539 
U.S. at 179. In other words, "has the Government, in 
light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible alterna-
tives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular 
course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for 
that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the 
individual's protected interest in refusing it?" Id. at 
[*1114] 183. nl2 The Second Circuit determined the 
remaining Sell factors depend upon factual findings and 
ought to be proved by the government by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160. Recognizing 
the vital constitutional liberty interest at stake, we agree. 
We review conclusions of law de novo and findings of 
fact for clear error. Stillwater Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
CIT Group/Equipment Finan. Inc., 383 F.3d 1148, 1150 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
nl2 See also United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 
560, 568 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), va-
cated by 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S. 
Ct. 2174(2003). 
The first question, therefore, is 
whether the district court erred by 
holding that the government's in-
terest in bringing Sell to trial is 
sufficient to outweigh Sell's inter-
est in refusing medication. This is 
a mixed question of law and fact, 
so we review the district court's 
finding de novo. To make this de-
termination, we must weigh the 
government's interest in rendering 
Sell competent against Sell's inter-
est in refusing unwanted medica-
tion. 
[**15] 
III. Discussion 
The question whether a district court has followed 
the correct procedures under Sell for involuntary admini-
stration of antipsychotic medication to a non-dangerous 
criminal defendant for the purpose of rendering him 
competent to stand trial nl3 is one of first impression in 
this circuit. We first observe the predicate for the Sell 
factors is clearly established by the record. There is no 
dispute Bradley is mentally ill. Nor is it contested he 
faces serious criminal charges (the three pending crimi-
nal charges against him permit imprisonment for a total 
of 50 years). We now take up the propriety of the court's 
order with respect to the Sell factors ad seriatim. 
nl3 In Sell, the Supreme Court stated that it 
was not necessary for a court to satisfy the stan-
dards for involuntary administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs in order to render a defendant com-
petent to stand trial if there was an independent 
and sufficient basis to otherwise order their ad-
ministration, such as where the defendant is dan-
gerous or where withholding of the drugs would 
endanger his or her health. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-
83. The record in this case provides no basis for 
an order for involuntary administration of antip-
sychotic drugs on the basis of dangerousness or 
threat to health. 
[**16] 
We turn first to the factual findings. Sell directs the 
court to determine whether or not administration of an-
tipsychotic medication is medically appropriate, "i.e., in 
the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition. The specific kinds of drugs at issue may mat-
ter here as elsewhere. Different kinds of antipsychotic 
drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy dif-
ferent levels of success." Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. This nec-
essarily includes a determination that administration of 
the drug regimen is "substantially likely to render the 
defendant competent to stand trial." Id. 
Dr. DeMier characterized administration of antipsy-
chotic medication in general as "the treatment of choice 
for a psychotic disorder" and superior to non-
pharmaceutical interventions. (Appellee App. at 41.) He 
indicated that while some patients may suffer side effects 
from administration of antipsychotic medications, these 
are typically of the nuisance variety and able to be effec-
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tively treated. He added that "use of the newer 'atypical' 
antipsychotic medications has largely eliminated the ne-
cessity to prescribe a second medication to alleviate side 
effects. [**17] " {Id. at 42.) Also, with the newer drugs, 
"severe side effects [are] becoming increasingly rare." 
{Id.) He cautioned that "because individuals vary greatly 
in their therapeutic responses to psychiatric medications, 
and in their susceptibility to side effects, it is important 
[*1115] to continue to monitor them regularly." {Id. at 
43.) Most significant, in our view, was Dr. DeMier's ob-
servation that "individuals with psychotic disorders typi-
cally have severe impairment in both the form and con-
tent of their thoughts[,]" and "the therapeutic effect [of] 
antipsychotic medication is to improve thinking." {Id.) In 
his opinion, 
[a] course of inpatient mental health 
treatment which includes the administra-
tion of psychiatric medications is usually 
sufficient to restore a defendant to compe-
tency. It is the experience of the clinicians 
at this facility that more than 80% of de-
fendants committed for competency resto-
ration treatment are later deemed compe-
tent by the trier of fact. 
{Id.) He was guardedly optimistic that administration of 
antipsychotic medication would materially aid in restor-
ing Bradley to competency. Based on Dr. DeMier's re-
port and testimony, [**18] the district court found that 
Bradley would 
substantially benefit from the administra-
tion of psychiatric medications . . . and 
that the therapeutic effect of these antip-
sychotic medications far outweigh any po-
tential negative side effects to their ad-
ministration and that, in any event, there 
are appropriate mechanisms available to 
monitor the defendant's administration of 
these drugs to ensure that he does not suf-
fer from some adverse consequence of 
these drugs. 
{Id. at 83-84.) 
The excerpted record admits of little challenge to the 
proposition that administration of antipsychotic drugs 
would substantially aid Bradley's return to competency. 
We conclude the Government met its burden of estab-
lishing by clear and convincing evidence that such a 
regimen was medically appropriate, and the district court 
did not clearly err in so finding. 
Next, Sell directs an inquiry into whether "admini-
stration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side 
effects that will interfere significantly with the defen-
dant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial de-
fense, thereby rendering the trial unfair." Id. Dr. DeMier 
initially reported that while Bradley had [**19] a "sound 
understanding of legal processes in the abstract, his psy-
chotic mental illness prevents him from applying that 
information to his own case in a rational manner." (Ap-
pellee App. at 29.) He later added that "treatment of [his] 
impairments [with antipsychotic drugs] is likely to en-
hance, rather than undermine, the fairness of any legal 
proceeding in which the patient is a participant." {Id. at 
43.) The court so found. The record is bereft of any chal-
lenge to this proposition. It is patent from the evidence. 
Therefore, the court did not clearly err in its finding. 
Finally, "the court must find that any alternative, less 
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially 
the same results. And the court must consider less intru-
sive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a court or-
der to the defendant backed by the contempt power, be-
fore considering more intrusive methods." Id. at 181 (ci-
tations omitted). As earlier noted, Dr. DeMier reported 
that an antipsychotic drug regimen was the treatment of 
choice for psychosis and far superior to non-
pharmaceutical interventions. There is nothing in the 
record to rebut this proposition. To the end, the court 
tried [**20] to induce Bradley to voluntarily consent to 
the drug therapy. Even as it entered its order for involun-
tary administration of antipsychotic drugs, the court or-
dered Dr. DeMier and Bradley's counsel to separately 
confer with Bradley on the advantage of voluntarily 
submitting to treatment. 
[*1116] Furthermore, the court considered and or-
dered a less intrusive means of implementing its order 
for involuntary drug therapy. If Bradley continued to 
refuse to lake the drugs, the consequence was not that he 
would be forcibly medicated against his will, but that he 
would have to answer to the court for his refusal. This is 
a measured and appropriate response by the district judge 
to the circumstances presented. Therefore, we conclude 
the Government met its burden in establishing by clear 
and convincing evidence that less intrusive treatments 
were "unlikely to achieve substantially the same results," 
id., as drug therapy, and the court did not err in so find-
ing. 
We now turn to the court's legal conclusions. Sell 
first requires a legal determination whether "important 
governmental [trial-related] interests are at stake." Id. at 
180. The district court concluded in the affirmative. 
[**21] Sell elaborates on this requirement. It does so in 
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the context of well-settled law that considers the Gov-
ernment's interest in bringing a criminal defendant to 
trial to be fundamental. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337, 347, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (The "constitutional power to bring 
an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered 
liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace."). 
However, while "the Government's interest in bringing to 
trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important 
. . . courts must consider the facts of the individual case 
in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution. 
Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that 
interest." Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
The Court offered two examples of special circum-
stances. In the first, a defendant, in the absence of court-
ordered administration of psychiatric medication, might 
suffer lengthy civil commitment for mental illness "that 
would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing 
without punishment one who has committed a serious 
crime." Id. In the second, a defendant may have already 
been confined [**22] for a lengthy period of time pend-
ing a determination of competency, confinement for 
which he or she would receive credit against any sen-
tence ultimately imposed. Id. As we read Sell, this latter 
example suggests that when the amount of time the de-
fendant is confined pending determination of compe-
tency is in parity with an expected sentence in the crimi-
nal proceeding, the Government may no longer be able 
to claim an important interest in prosecution. 
Neither example applies here. The federal civil 
commitment statute requires a showing that the proposed 
patient presents "a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another person or serious damage to property of an-
other^]" 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The State of Wyoming, 
where Bradley is domiciled, requires proof of mental 
illness for civil commitment, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-
10-110(j), with mental illness defined as "a physical, 
emotional, mental or behavioral disorder which causes a 
person to be dangerous to himself or others and which 
requires treatment[.]" WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-
101(a)(ix). Dr. DeMier reported Bradley presented no 
threat to himself [**23] or others within the facility 
where he was held. nl4 He testified he did not evaluate 
for risk to persons or property outside of the facility. In 
all, the record does not support [*1117] the proposition 
that Bradley would be a candidate for civil commitment. 
nl5 
nl4 "His behavior has been cordial, coopera-
tive, and he's exhibited no behaviors at this facil-
ity that have caused us any concern for our safety 
or the safety of other people around Mr. Bradley 
within this setting." (Appellee App. at 57.) 
nl5 We hasten to add, as the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has noted, that while civil com-
mitment might reduce the danger to the commu-
nity posed by an individual, 
the civil commitment argument 
assumes that the government's es-
sential penological interests lie 
only in incapacitating dangerous 
offenders. It ignores the retribu-
tive, deterrent, communicative, 
and investigative functions of the 
criminal justice system, which 
serve to ensure that offenders re-
ceive their just deserts, to make 
clear that offenses entail conse-
quences, and to discover what 
happened through the public 
mechanism of trial. 
United States v. Weston, 347 U.S. App. B.C. 145, 
255 F.3d873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
[**24] 
Nor does the second example apply. Less than nine 
months elapsed between Bradley's commitment for com-
petency examination and the court's order for involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs. This span of time 
pales in comparison to the fifty years imprisonment 
Bradley faces if convicted of the charges against him. 
Without an order for the involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs, and with Bradley's continuing re-
fusal to voluntarily accept such drug therapy, the addi-
tional length of time Bradley could be held pending 
competency determination is limited. See 18 U.S.C. § 
4241(d). 
Apart from these failed examples, we can identify 
no other special circumstances tending to diminish the 
importance of the Government's interest in restoring 
Bradley to competence so that he may face trial. There-
fore, we find no error in the court's legal conclusion that 
important Government interests are at stake in restoring 
Bradley to competency. 
Finally, we reach the ultimate legal question whether 
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs "is 
necessary significantly to further," Sell, 539 U.S. at 179, 
the important governmental trial-related [**25] interests 
in returning Bradley to competency. Here, the court's 
factual findings come into play. Without any one of these 
findings, it is impossible to say that involuntary admini-
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station of antipsychotic drugs would further the Gov-
ernment's interest in restoring Bradley to competency. 
See id. at 181. However, with the court having not 
clearly erred in making any of its findings, we easily 
conclude its order for involuntary administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs will significantly further important 
governmental trial-related interests. In other words, the 
need for treatment with antipsychotic drugs is "suffi-
ciently important to overcome [Bradley's] protected in-
terest in refusing it." Id. at 183. 
IV. Conclusion 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district 
court. 
